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 1 
Abstract 
 
 Revived in 1896 by the Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, the Olympic Games have 
come to represent the ultimate international celebration of sport, culture, and the human 
spirit. The grandiose festival of the current day evolved into its mature form throughout 
the course of the twentieth century. However, no Olympiad altered the Olympic 
Movement as radically as the Berlin Olympics of 1936.  Through the examination of key 
secondary sources and primary sources like, International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
records, personal testimonies, and newspaper articles, this thesis examines how and why 
the 1936 Nazi Olympics fundamentally altered the Olympic Movement and forced the 
Olympic Games to confront and adapt to a rapidly changing world. While the 1936 
Berlin Games set many new precedents in the Olympic Games, three in particular stand 
out: the politicization of the host city selection process; the rise of government 
investment in Olympic outcomes; and the use of new technology and media.  
  
 2 
Introduction 
On April 21, 2016 the Greek gymnast Eleftherios “Lefteris” Petroinias embarked 
on the first leg of the Rio 2016 Torch Relay.1 Starting in Olympia, Greece in recognition 
of the birthplace of the ancient Olympic tradition, Petroinias was the first of 24,450 
torchbearers who were given the honor of carrying the Olympic flame towards Rio.2 The 
journey in total traversed three countries and 38,235km before entering the Maracanã 
Stadium in Rio de Janeiro on August 5, 2016.3 Finally, at the end of the three-month 
odyssey, Brazilian long distance runner Vanderlei Cordeiro de Lima ran the last leg into 
the stadium, climbed the stage, and lit the grand Olympic cauldron.4 In front of a packed 
stadium and the acting President of Brazil, Michel Temer, Cordeiro de Lima must have 
felt a similar rush of emotions as Fritz Schilgen, the very first final torchbearer. Although 
Schilgen’s audience in 1936 would have been limited to those in attendance at the 
Olympic Stadium in Berlin, no doubt the German distance runner was filled with the 
same excitement as his 2016 counterpart when he ran into the crowded stadium, past his 
Führer, Adolf Hitler, and lit the inaugural Olympic Flame. 
 The Olympic Torch Relay, now an inextricable part of the modern Olympic 
Games, was a Nazi influenced creation of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Olympic Games in 
the midst of the Third Reich were the first truly modern Olympics comparable to the 
                                                        
1 “Rio 2016 Torch Relay,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 7, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/rio-2016-torch-relay.  
2 “Rio 2016 Torch Relay.” 
3 “Olympic Torch Relay Reaches the Finishing Line,” International Olympic Committee, 
last modified August 7, 2016, 
https://www.olympic.org/news/manual%20news/2016/08/06/olympic%20torch%20relay
%20reaches%20the%20finishing%20line. 
4 “Olympic Torch Relay Reaches the Finishing Line.” 
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spectacle now associated with the event. The Berlin Games can be classified as truly 
modern for a number of reasons, but three stand out: first, the politicization of the 
selection process; the rise of government investment in Olympic outcomes; and the use of 
technology and media. The Nazis unique placement in history and their particular 
ideology made the achievements of the 1936 Games possible. Hitler and the Nazis came 
to power at a time when the technologies most associated with the Olympics, television 
and radio, emerged. The available technology, in conjunction with the Nazi facility for 
propaganda and their unrelenting political agenda, propelled the Berlin Olympics into the 
modern age.  
The man responsible for the revival of the Olympic Games was Pierre de 
Coubertin. The Frenchman, born in 1863 to an aristocratic family in Paris, grew up 
amidst the embarrassing French defeat at the hands of the Germans in the Franco-
Prussian War in 1871. Coubertin interpreted the cause of French defeat as the lack of 
physical strength of French youth in the army.5 The war impressed on Coubertin the 
value of physical wellness for a nation’s vitality. In his twenties Coubertin had the chance 
to travel to England, and the trip proved to be very influential to the young man. While in 
England he was impressed by the integration of sport into education and the positive 
impact exercise had on student performance and happiness. Strongly shaped by his 
travels, Coubertin came to view “athletics and games as key educational activities, able to 
produce all-round men and to free French youth from moral and physical inertia.”6 
                                                        
5 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1984), 8. 
6 Eugen Weber, France Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Bellknap Press, 1988), 224. 
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Coubertin’s philosophy, now often referred to as “Olympism,” recognized sport’s unique 
ability to bring balance and harmony to a person’s mind, body, and soul.7 In June 1894 
Coubertin organized the International Athletic Congress with leaders from international 
sports clubs from all over the world. At the congress Coubertin pitched his ambitious idea 
for an international sporting contest that would unite different countries and cultures 
around the virtuous pursuit of athletic excellence. At the end of the Paris Congress 
Coubertin realized his dream. After a vote of the congress, the congress established the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Athens was picked as the first location for 
the modern Olympic Games.8 
In 1896 sports were just beginning to gain significant cultural prominence in 
many European and American nations. England had integrated sport into schools,  
collegiate athletics started to develop in the United States, and the Germans were famous 
for Turnen, “an extremely nationalistic form of gymnastics.”9 Sports increasingly gained 
popularity around the world, especially in Europe. However, no international sporting 
contests of note existed prior to 1895, when American and English track teams met in 
New York for a bi-national meet.10 The 1896 Athens Games were the first major 
international sporting event, and country participation reflected the infancy of the 
Olympic Movement. Only fourteen countries attended with a total of 241 athletes and 
                                                        
7 Pierre de Coubertin, Olympism: Selected Writings, ed. Norbert Müller (Lausanne: 
International Olympic Committee, 2000), 534. 
8 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter (Lausanne: International Olympic 
Committee, 2016), 10.  
9 Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, 8. 
10 Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 
19-20. 
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most of the spectators were Greek.11 To compare, the 2016 Rio Olympics attracted 207 
countries and 11,237 athletes.12 International enthusiasm for the Athens Games was 
underwhelming to say the least. The Athens 1896 Games would be almost 
unrecognizable to a modern audience. Besides the absence of technology, many of the 
honored traditions associated with the Olympic Games were not yet established. For 
example, a silver medal and a diploma were awarded to the first place winner instead of 
the now customary gold medal. Also, the athletic capabilities of the competitors would 
not conjure awe among viewers like the athletes of the following centuries. The intense 
years of training and preparation expected from the Olympic athletes of today lay far 
away from the reality of the 1896 athletes.  
During the early years, the organizers of the Olympic Games struggled to gain a 
meaningful place in the world’s cultural consciousness as Coubertin envisioned. In 1900 
the Games traveled to Coubertin’s beloved Paris, but the French, and more generally, the 
international audience, evinced little interest in the revived Olympic Games. The lack of 
respect for the games was made apparent by the decision to make the Olympics merely a 
supplementary Exposition Universalle Internationale’s programming. The problems with 
the 1900 Olympics were numerous. The organizers of the Exposition felt that “sports 
were for morons,” an attitude resulting in minimal attention given to the Olympic 
competitions.13 Attendance at events was low and the facilities were abysmal. The 
                                                        
11 “Athens 1986,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/athens-1896. 
12 “Rio 2016,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/rio-2016.  
13 David Clay Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 2007), 22-3. 
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organizers held the track events in a public park with the ever impending danger of a 
discus or javelin hitting passing civilians. Meanwhile the swimmers competed in the 
polluted Seine River and had to deal with dangerous waters, much like the rowers, open-
water swimmers, and sailors competing in the 2016 Rio Olympics.14 The organizers also 
stretched the Games out for an unreasonable five and a half months diminishing the 
ability of the Games to create any sort of dramatic buildup of excitement. The one bright 
spot in the 1900 Games was increased participation. Twenty-four countries accepted the 
invitation to Paris, a marked improvement from the fourteen in Athens.15 Yet the 
Exposition’s treatment of the Olympics as a mildly interesting sideshow once again made 
the Games an underwhelming affair, much to Coubertin’s chagrin. 
Leading up to World War I the Olympic Games gradually improved in 
organization, participation, and cultural influence. With the exception of St. Louis in 
1904, the Games continued to grow after the turn of the century. The 1904 Games in St. 
Louis repeated many of the mistakes of Paris. Organizers once again spread the 
programming of the Games out over the course of a few months to coincide with the 
1904 World’s Fair. St. Louis’ geographical location also deterred many countries from 
even sending a team due to the high travel costs and the inconvenience of the trans-
Atlantic journey. Coubertin himself, the founder of the revived Olympics, refused to 
make the journey. For the 1904 Games only a total of twelve countries sent teams to 
                                                        
14 Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 23. 
15 “Paris 1900,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/paris-1900. 
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Missouri.16 Even though St. Louis failed to advance the Olympic Movement, the relative 
success of next two Olympiads in London and then Stockholm exhibited the growing 
popularity of the event. London in 1908 drew more spectators and athletes than the three 
preceding Games, as well as a crowd of international journalists.17 London was also the 
first instance in Olympic history where the host city constructed a stadium to specifically 
accommodate the Olympic Games. The structure built for 1908 boasted space for 70,000 
viewers and created the sense of spectacle associated with the modern Games.18 The 
following Olympics hosted by Stockholm in 1912 were distinguished as the “proper 
athletic festival” Coubertin imagined.19 The Swedish organizers planned and executed the 
Games impeccably, unlike their preceding hosts. The Swedish organizers facilitated 
events efficiently with the help of new timekeeping technology and an independent 
international group of judges. Stockholm also attracted more countries than ever, 
including the Eastern country of Japan. Another indication the Olympics successfully 
gained prestige on the world stage by 1912 was the involvement of many powerful 
international leaders. King Leopold II of Belgium was appointed the honorary president 
of the Stockholm Games, and other European royalty even granted Coubertin permission 
to use their names on official letterheads and promotional material.20 By 1912 the revived 
Olympic Games had become a respected international event drawing participation from 
all over the globe.  
                                                        
16 “St. Louis 1904,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 9, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/st-louis-1904. 
17 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 31. 
18 Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 23. 
19 Mandell, Nazi Olympics, 31. 
20 Mandell, Nazi Olympics, 33. 
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The outbreak of World War I shortly after the successful Stockholm Games 
threatened to make the Olympic Games one of its casualties and squelch the momentum 
the Games collected during the beginning of the century. In 1912 at the annual IOC 
meeting, the committee selected Berlin as the host of the 1916 Games. By 1915 with no 
end to conflict in sight Coubertin acquiesced to an increasingly agitated international 
community at war and canceled the 1916 Berlin Games. Instead of choosing another host 
city at the last minute Coubertin and the IOC decided to cancel the games completely. 
Despite the cancellation, the Games had taken a step toward politicization, which the 
Nazis would seize upon later in the 1930s.  
When the Olympic Games resumed in 1920 in Antwerp the world deeply felt the 
effects of war. The host country, Belgium was one of the most severely ravaged nations 
during World War I. The daunting tasks of rebuilding after war and readying Antwerp for 
the next Olympic Games were compounded by giving a short one-year period of 
preparation time to ready the afflicted nation for visitors.21 The result was an underfunded 
and under attended event with poor facilities and accommodations. Notably the Germans, 
Austrians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Hungarians were not invited to participate in the 
Olympics. Their aggression during the war was deemed inconsistent with the peaceful 
nature of the Games and until 1936 in Amsterdam they were not invited back again.22 
The newly formed USSR opted out of participating by its own choice. Despite difficulties 
faced in the execution of the 1920 Antwerp Games, it was a significant year for the 
establishment of Olympic tradition. For the first time the iconic five ring Olympic flag 
                                                        
21 Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 40. 
22 Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 39-40. 
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was raised above the Olympic stadium and the athletes recited the Olympic oath. Still, the 
1920 Antwerp Games were compromised by the continued impact of the Great War.  
The remaining Games in the 1920s eventually recovered and surpassed the scope 
and importance of the pre-war era Games. The 1924 Olympics found their way back to 
Paris. Unlike the first Olympiad Paris hosted in 1900, the 1924 Olympic Games did not 
have to share the limelight with another event. As if to make up for the lack of attention 
paid to the international sporting festival in 1900, the French made certain to fill their 
second time hosting with as much celebration as possible. On the first day of Olympic 
competition a total of zero events were held. The competitions had to wait until the 
second day of the Games because the French organizers packed so much content and 
fanfare into the programming of the opening ceremonies there simply was no time for 
anything else on the opening day.23 The French showmanship in Paris 1924 raised 
expectations for the Olympics that followed. 1924 also brought with it the inaugural 
Winter Olympiad in Chamonix, France. Coubertin and the IOC regarded the idea of the 
Winter Games warily, suggesting that winter sports did not fit into the ancient Greek 
tradition of sport. The IOC also objected to the inequalities inherent in winter sports as 
certain climates and terrains not present in all nations were required for success.24 In fact, 
the IOC did not recognize the 1924 as an official Olympic Competition until two years 
after the events took place. At the 22nd session in Lisbon the IOC reclassified the week-
long series of events in France as the first Winter Olympiad.25 The winter experiment in 
                                                        
23 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 37.  
24 Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936, 44. 
25 Coubertin, Olympism, 522. 
 10 
Chamonix proved to be a great success and the Winter Olympics were born. From 1924 
to 1986 the Summer and Winter Games were held in the same year until the IOC decided 
to place the Games on varying schedules.  
In 1928 the Olympic Games moved on to Amsterdam. Finally, after missing two 
Olympic Games and the inaugural Winter Games, Germany and the rest of the banished 
nations received invitations to the 1928 Olympics. The intensity of the athletic 
competitions heightened in 1928 as well. In the early years of the Olympics the 
Americans usually dominated the competitions. However, in 1928 improvements in 
athletic quality around the world were apparent. The winners standing on the podiums 
were increasingly international. Victors hailed from a myriad of countries in 1928 
including Canada, many Scandinavian countries, Japan, Algeria, and Chile.26 Germany, 
despite not participating in an Olympiad since 1912,  also had strong performances in 
rowing and gymnastics.27 
The last Games before the infamous 1936 Olympics were awarded to the city of 
Los Angeles. For the second time the Olympics traveled the long distance from the IOC 
headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland to America. When Los Angeles won the honor of 
hosting in 1923 the Los Angeles organizers could not have predicted the struggle they 
were about to face. The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great Depression 
presented a staggering financial problem. However, even though the world experienced 
widespread financial strife, Los Angeles turned out to be the grandest Olympic Games 
yet. In addition to the construction of a massive stadium with a capacity of over 100,000 
                                                        
26 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 38. 
27 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 38. 
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people, Los Angeles constructed a new auditorium for boxing and wrestling, new 
swimming facilities, a shooting range, and stands for 17,000 spectators to watch the 
rowing competitions.28 Los Angeles also set itself apart from previous Olympics with the 
unique creation of the Olympic Village. In response to athlete complaints about poor 
accommodations in years past, the Olympic Village was intended to further Coubertin’s 
vision of the Olympics as a uniting force of goodwill. The small city was constructed on 
a sprawling hill overlooking the stadium in the hills surrounding Los Angeles.29 The 
Olympic Village, although it was a very nice accommodation, only housed the male 
athletes. Female athletes lodged at the Chapman Park Hotel.30 The Games of 1932 were a 
grand event. Throughout the course of the Games, eventual German Organizers carefully 
watched the Americans, took notes, and then patiently waited for their turn to get a crack 
at hosting the Olympic Games. 
Even before the 1936 Berlin Olympics opened on August 1, 1936 the XIth 
Olympiad already created new precedents in the Olympic Movement. The 1936 Olympic 
Games politicized the Olympic selection process. Before 1936 the host selection was a 
fairly straightforward process. When the IOC did not simply pick a city of one of the 
committee members, cities presented the IOC with feasibility studies showing the 
logistical and financial capabilities of a city to host. The IOC then voted at the annual 
IOC session and a new host city was selected. The 1936 Berlin Olympics turned the 
                                                        
28 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 39. 
29 Wilson, Gwynn, and F.G. Browne. The Games of the Xth Olympiad: Los Angeles 1932  
Official Report (Los Angeles: Wolfer Printing Co., 1933), 292.  
30  Gwynn et al., The Games of the Xth Olympiad: Los Angeles 1932  
Official, 335 
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bidding process into an extension of international politics. The political stakes in the 
selection process heightened when backlash from an American led threat of a boycott 
almost ended Berlin’s Olympic Games before they even started. The presence of the 
boycott based on German racial policy also politicized the choice to participate in the 
Olympic Games. Accepting an invitation represented a political act in support of the 
policies of the host nation. 
The Berlin Games ushered in a new era of government involvement in Olympic 
outcomes. Prior to Berlin, the Games always minimally interacted with national 
governing bodies, but 1936 was different. The Nazi government’s involvement with the 
planning, formation of the German Olympic Team, and the financing of the Games was 
more intimate than any previous host government. For the Nazi regime the Olympic 
Games were a chance to prove its legitimacy and competency to the rest of the world. 
The desire for success in the Olympic Games and the calculated messages the Nazis 
wanted to convey to the international community resulted in Nazi control of sport within 
Germany, and elaborate propaganda efforts. The Nazis’ involvement in the Olympic team 
created a shift in Olympic ideology which led to widespread government involvement in 
the Olympic Movement. Later in the century and into the new millennium the increased 
prestige of the Games and corresponding increased government intercessions manifested 
in doping scandals, infiltration of the Olympic planning process, and financial support.  
The modern Olympic Games of the current day are unrecognizable without the 
technology and media coverage that transports the Olympic Games all the way across the 
world, and into audiences’ living rooms. The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the first 
Olympic Games that fully utilized the technology of the day for commercial purposes to 
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promote and facilitate the Games. The German Olympic Committee’s (GOC) press 
efforts to spread news of the Games worldwide reached more people than ever before 
The Berlin Games were also set apart by the use of technological innovations. The radio 
broadcasting operation set up by the German Organizing Committee was unrivalled in in 
its time and the 1936 Berlin Olympics broadcasted the first televised sporting event in 
history. The support of the Nazis also financed the groundbreaking film Olympia, by Leni 
Riefenstahl. The cinematic achievement featured brand new techniques and equipment to 
the field of sports photography that fundamentally changed how the art developed. The 
scale of the media efforts and the technological innovations set the 1936 Olympics apart 
from its predecessors, and provided the first instance of a technologically modern 
Olympics.  
The 1936 Berlin Olympic Games have been extensively written about given the 
controversial nature of Nazi regime that organized them. However, scholarship and 
investigation into the 1936 Olympics began to emerge in conjunction with the rise of 
sports as a historical field of study. One of the two secondary sources this paper relies on 
most heavily is the book The Nazi Olympics, written by the historian Richard Mandell. 
Mandell wrote and published The Nazi Olympics in 1971 at a time when scholarship 
about the modern Olympic Games was almost nonexistent, especially in America. The 
Nazi Olympics, the first of its kind, applied scholarly study to the 1936 Olympics. His 
work helped lead scholarship towards more comprehensive studies of the modern 
Olympics. The other secondary source this paper draws from is the book, Nazi Games: 
The Olympics of 1936, by David Clay Large. Large’s book relied on many sources of 
primary evidence which were unavailable to the author of this paper, like archive records 
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of correspondence between key Nazi leaders, the correspondence between Olympic 
officials, and IOC session minutes. The sources used by Large aided the research of this 
paper as they provided access to information otherwise unattainable.  
In the secondary sources the sub theme of the modernity of the 1936 Olympics 
existed, but was not explicitly explored as an argument itself. From the underlying 
argument in the works of Mandell, Large, and others this paper focused on investigating 
why the 1936 Olympic Games warrant the classification as the first truly modern 
Olympic Games. Mandell focuses on placing a historical lens on the 1936 Olympics to 
examine the political and cultural significance of the Nazi Olympics as well as the 
modern Olympic Movement more generally.  Large, writing in 2007, differed from 
Mandell’s work in that he had the advantage of time passed. With more scholarship to 
draw from Large attempts to “clear the air”. Given the vast amount of available literature 
on the 1936 Olympics in 2007, Large’s goal was to examine Berlin in 1936 and provide a 
comprehensive account to dispel some of the popular mythology surrounding the Nazi 
Games. 
To supplement the secondary sources in this paper various primary sources were 
used to deepen analysis of the claims and evidence presented in works like Mandell and 
Large’s. The International Olympic Committee Official Reports from every Olympiad 
provided a wealth of information. From describing the financing and planning process of 
the Olympic Games to listing the winners, the Official Reports proved a useful source to 
help illuminate and support the claims of the secondary sources. Newspaper articles were 
another primary source that proved helpful. Specifically, American newspapers 
illuminated attitudes of the international community towards the Nazi regime and 
 15 
provided a record of how much of the Nazi activity was known to the world and when. 
To gain insight into more personal experiences relating to the 1936 Olympic Games the 
University of Southern California Shoah Foundation collection of oral histories 
contributed fascinating personal testimonials. The video interviews recorded the stories 
and experiences of Jews in relation to the Berlin Olympics. With the combination of 
primary and secondary source this paper analyzed a new line of argument in relation to 
the 1936 Olympic Games.  
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Chapter 1: The Politicization of the Selection Process 
 
 Before the Olympic competition actually commences, potential host cities scrap 
and scrape their way to obtain the now coveted opportunity to host the Olympic Games. 
The IOC bid process more than likely is not what is conjured in the imagination of people 
across the world when they think about the Olympic Games. However, the selection 
process has become as much of a game as the sporting competitions themselves. 
Throughout the course of the Olympic Games the selection process became highly 
regulated by the IOC and quite extensive. The 1936 selection process aided the evolution 
of the because it politicized the proceedings and opened the procedure up to abuses.   
 The selection of Athens as the host city for the inaugural 1896 Games was rather 
informal compared to the three yearlong application process of current Olympiads. The 
first Olympic Congress, organized by the efforts of Pierre de Coubertin, united leaders of 
sport clubs and organizations from around the world at Paris-Sorbonne University to 
discuss the revival of the Olympic Games. In June 1984 over 2000 people attended 
Coubertin’s congress.31 During the final meeting of the congress on June 23 all of 
Coubertin’s efforts were rewarded when the congress unanimously voted to revive the 
Ancient Olympic Games.32 The congress also established the initial fourteen member 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the first official governing body of the 
revived Olympic Movement.33 Finally, as the last order of business the congress decided 
                                                        
31 Pierre de Coubertin, Timoleon J. Philemon, N. G. Politis, and Charalambos Anninos, 
Second Part: The Olympic Games in 1896 (Athens: Charles Beck, 1897), 8. 
32 “I Olympic Congress –Paris 1984,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 
9, 2017, https://www.olympic.org/paris-1894-olympic-congress. 
33 Coubertin et al., The Olympic Games in 1896, 8. 
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to hold the first Olympic Games in the year 1896. At the suggestion of the Greek man 
Demetrius Vikelas, the eventual first president of the IOC, the congress selected Athens 
as the first locale.34 Given the historic connection of Athens to the Olympic Games the 
congress and newly created IOC easily selected the first host city. The matter of the 
location of the second Olympiad was also settled at the first Olympic Congress. Paris, 
France received the distinction of hosting the second Olympiad in 1900 to coincide with 
the World’s Fair.35    
 After the irregular selection process for the first two Olympiads the host city 
selection process did not immediately become the well laid out process known today. The 
selection process for the 1904 Games started to set important precedence for following 
Games despite its unusual circumstance. Initially, at the 1901 session, the IOC chose 
Chicago as the host of the 1904 Olympics. However, conflict arose when the World’s 
Fair in St. Louis was pushed back from 1903 to 1904 and the Missouri city presented 
itself as another option.36 After a vote of the IOC in 1902 St. Louis officially secured the 
1904 Olympic Games. Even though Chicago lost the 1904 Games, the city of Chicago 
went about securing the Olympic Games with elements of what are now requirements in 
the selection process. First, a committee of interested Chicagoans formed with the 
purpose of seeing to the planning and support of the potential Olympic Games. The 
group, named the Chicago Committee, “included the heads of three major banks in 
                                                        
34 Coubertin et al., The Olympic Games in 1896, 8. 
35 “Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List”, Historical Archives: Olympic Studies Centre, 
last modified April 15, 2011, https://library.olympic.org/Default/archives-
historiques.aspx, 2. 
36 “Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 6. 
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Chicago, the president of the Art Institute, the president of the University, a qualified 
representative of the press, and five or six ‘prominent’ citizens.”37 The Chicago 
Committee reflects the selection process standard of establishing an organizing 
committee before making a bid. The aforementioned committee also submitted a 
comprehensive file to the IOC. The file contained a variety of documents and studies 
relating to the feasibility of the city’s ability to host the Games. Documents like a signed 
statement from the University of Chicago’s president promising the use of the 
university’s playing fields for free, a rough financial plan to finance the affair with 
200,000 francs already secured, and a rough outline of a schedule of all the sports 
competitions and cultural events.38 The Chicago Committee finally also established the 
convention of hiring advocates to convincingly persuade the IOC. Mr. Henry Bréal, an 
attorney, successfully swayed IOC support and elicited enthusiasm from the prestigious 
Olympic committee.39 Although the 1904 Olympic selection was unusual, the preparation 
and care shown by the Chicago Committee to convincingly prove to the IOC that the city 
of Chicago could logistically support the Olympic Games became the minimal standard 
in the selection process prior to 1936.  
In the early years of the Olympic Games the selection process was very 
unregulated. Interested host cities provided feasibility studies and documents to the IOC 
and then the IOC voted for the most attractive option, or went with the choice of an IOC 
member (most likely Coubertin).40 The process was not yet meticulously laid out and 
                                                        
37 Coubertin, Olympism, 399-400.  
38 Coubertin, Olympism, 400. 
39 Coubertin, Olympism, 400. 
40 “Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 20. 
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technically no requirements existed in the IOC’s Olympic Charter. The selection process 
was governed by precedence and the judgement of the IOC. The minimum standards in 
the selection process from the early twentieth century up to 1936 were simply a financial 
and logistic report demonstrating the capability of the potential host city to handle 
demands of the Games. The only major change to the selection process leading up to the 
selection of Berlin in 1936 was the inclusion of the Winter Games. After the first Winter 
Games in 1924 the IOC allowed the host city selected for the Summer Olympics the first 
shot at hosting the Winter Olympics. Following 1924 if a city wanted to host both they 
would have to prove the feasibility for both Games. An “official selection procedure” was 
not installed until 1947 for the selection of the 1952 Olympics.41 The new procedure only 
required candidate cities to give a 30-minute presentation in front of the IOC.42 The 
extensive two to three-year process of today resulted from an evolution of the IOC 
charter to curb abuses and corruption within the Olympic Movement originating in 1936. 
Berlin marked the first instance of under the table tactics and leveraging political 
influence to succeed in the selection process. 
 
Selecting Berlin 
Germany started down the long road to the 1936 Berlin Olympics long before 
1931 when the IOC selected Berlin as the host for the Eleventh Olympiad. Back in 1912 
the IOC selected Berlin to host the 1916 Olympic Games. Berlin won the bid in 1912 
because of a generous donation secured by the city of Berlin from The Union Racing 
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Club allowing for the construction of an Olympic stadium.43 Like today, in 1916 the IOC 
would shy away from a bid without secure funds to support the expensive endeavor.  
Theodor Lewald’s role in the organization of the 1916 Games in Berlin laid some of the 
groundwork necessary to secure the bid almost twenty years later. Lewald’s efforts most 
impacted the procurement of funds. As a high-level government official, Lewald played a 
substantial role in securing financing for the 1916 Games from the reluctant Reichstag. 
After the efforts expended in 1916 Lewald and the German sports world were prepped 
with the necessary experience to see the 1936 Olympics through to fruition.  
 While Berlin’s selection for 1936 was not the first time the city had been 
successful obtaining the honor of hosting, the efforts the second time around held more 
weight for national pride. Hosting offered Germany a chance to redeem itself and reenter 
the international community after World War I, and the efforts of the organizers were 
reinvigorated after Germany’s strong performance at the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics. The 
process began at the annual meeting of the IOC on April 27, 1927 in the city of Monaco 
when the German member of the IOC, Theodor Lewald presented Berlin’s bid to host.44 
However, despite Lewald’s early bid, the final votes were not cast until 1931. The 
beginning of Lewald’s unprecedented bid campaign started in 1930. Lewald convinced 
the IOC to hold the Ninth Olympic Congress in the city of Berlin. Hosting the Congress 
provided an opportunity for Lewald and other Berlin boosters to showcase the 
competency of Berlin and the city government. President Hindenburg even opened the 
Congress held at Berlin University and announced to the members of the IOC that should 
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they select Berlin, the Reich Government fully supported the Olympic Games.45 
Although now the presence of important politicians and celebrities is commonplace in 
cities’ quests to host, in 1930 Lewald introduced the Olympic world to the art of 
schmoozing. 
 Also being considered for the 1936 Games at the time of the Congress in 1930 
were Rome and Barcelona. Rome, under the control of a fascist government led by 
Benito Mussolini presented less of a threat to Lewald and Berlin. The members of the 
IOC shied away from Rome because of “the fascist government’s domination of Italian 
sport.”46 Irony abounds given the installation of the Nazi Regime and the “Aryanization” 
of sport within Nazi Germany a mere three years later. To undermine both Rome and 
Barcelona, Lewald employed the Prussian Meteorological Institute to conduct a study 
predicting unfavorable weather conditions during August in the two cities.47 Carl Diem 
then disseminated the study through a Dutch newspaper. Lewald’s efforts to convince his 
fellow IOC members resembled a political campaign. The German representative 
peppered his colleagues incessantly with letters urging them to vote for Berlin and 
express their support to the IOC president Baillet-Latour with letters of their own.48 
Lewald also used the weight of political officers to sway foreign IOC delegates. For 
example, Lewald asked the two German ambassadors to Japan to personally visit the 
Japanese IOC officers to convince them to vote for Berlin. The personal house call 
worked, both Japanese representatives voted for Berlin. Although, in exchange for 
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Japanese votes Lewald agreed to support Tokyo for the 1940 Olympic Games.49 Another 
factor working in favor of Berlin was the political turmoil within Spain during 1931 when 
the IOC scheduled its annual meeting in Barcelona. Most IOC delegates sent in their 
ballots remotely because of the political instability from the recent installation of the 
Second Spanish Republic not too long before the IOC meeting.  
The use of political relationships in the selection process for the 1936 Olympic 
Games led to the politicization of the host city choice. Not only did Lewald utilize the 
Weimar Republic President Paul von Hindenburg to advocate for Berlin, but he also took 
advantage of the political influence of the German ambassadors to Japan to secure votes. 
Other IOC members and Olympic bid committee members carried on and intensified 
Lewald’s tactics. The very next bid process for the 1940 Olympic Games exhibited the 
same type of diplomatic maneuvering as Lewald in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The 
serious contenders in the running for the 1940 Olympic Bid were Tokyo, Rome, and 
Helsinki.50 The Tokyo organizers, eager to win the bid and bring the Olympics to the East 
for the first time, decided to campaign using diplomacy. Prior to the 35th Congress of the 
IOC in 1935, Japanese IOC officials paid a visit to Benito Mussolini, the Prime Minister 
of Italy.51 Following Mussolini’s visit with the Japanese officials Italy’s premier gave a 
“sensational show of support for the Tokyo bid” and Rome withdrew its bid for the 1940 
Games.52 The next year in the 36th session of the IOC Tokyo beat out Helsinki and 
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secured the bid for 1940. Although Japan would be later stripped of the ability to host 
because of the Japanese government’s refusal to disengage from the Sino-Japanese War 
in 1937, the state-to-state campaign tactic once again prevailed in the Olympic selection 
process.53 
Lewald’s new diplomatic route to hosting using the influence of political figures 
and national governments gained more prominence during the Cold War era. The efforts 
expended by the Richard Nixon administration to keep the Soviet Union from obtaining 
the bid for the 1976 Summer Olympics exemplified how political influence was used to 
aid the selection process after 1936. Initially, the Nixon administration showed little 
interest in giving more support than a generic three sentence statement of encouragement 
to the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee that read, “I want to take this opportunity to 
congratulate you and the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee for obtaining the 
privilege of bidding for the 1976 [Olympic Games]…My best wishes to you and to the 
Committee.”54 The president of the Los Angeles Committee, John Kilroy continually 
requested aid from the Nixon administration, but all of Kilroy’s pleas, including a grant 
for $250,000, were rejected.55 Even a request to simply give a presentation to President 
Nixon was turned down. Met with nothing but disappointment, the Los Angeles 
Committee decided to change their strategy. With the help of an old business relationship 
between Rodney Rood, a member of the Committee, and H.R. Haldeman, the White 
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House chief of staff, the Committee framed the need for government assistance in the 
language of Cold War conflict. In a letter to Haldeman. After pointing out the Soviet’s 
ambition to obtain the 1976 Olympics, Rood wrote, “We are now in direct confrontation 
with the Soviet Union on the level of international politics – a confrontation to determine 
international public appeal under the guise of non-politics – the award of the Summer 
Olympic Games of 1976.”56 The Los Angeles Committee had good reason to desperately 
seek aid from the US government, given the Soviet government vehemently supported 
the Moscow bid. The appeal to American political interests proved extremely effective. 
Not only did the Nixon administration honor almost all of the requests of the Los Angeles 
Committee, but Nixon exerted his international influence as the President of the United 
States to influence the 1976 selection process. Nixon personally wrote to members of the 
IOC praising the city of Los Angeles and its bid, he instructed US ambassadors in 
countries with IOC members to put pressure on foreign administrations to encourage the 
IOC representatives to vote for Los Angeles, and Charles Stuart a representative of the 
Nixon administration attempted attain votes by bribing Latin American IOC members.57 
Similarly, the Moscow organizing team utilized the Soviet Union’s political position to 
obtain votes for Moscow. In the final vote, Moscow received twenty-eight votes from the 
twenty-eight communist nations represented in the IOC.58 Although the efforts of the Los 
Angeles Committee coupled with the Nixon administration, ultimately failed as Montréal 
received the 1976 bid, the Los Angeles Committee and the Moscow organizers both 
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utilized the diplomatic resources available to them and the prevailing political climate of 
the time. 
In the current selection process, similar to 1936 and the Cold War era, leveraging 
the support of diplomatic leaders has become paramount during the Olympic bidding 
process. One of the most common tactics used by bid committees is to bring prominent 
world leaders to their presentation to the IOC to illustrate governmental support and use 
their influence to potentially sway IOC members. For example, Barack and Michelle 
Obama travelled to Copenhagen during his presidency to present in front of the IOC on 
behalf of the Chicago bid for the 2016 Olympic Games.59 Besides Chicago’s failure to 
obtain the bid for 2016, power politics in the selection process have proven to be an 
effective tactic in the new millennium, unlike the mixed success it received during the 
Cold War. In the case of the 2012 London Summer Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Winter 
Olympics, the leveraging of national leadership helped secure both bids. The British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair actively campaigned at the deciding IOC session and made an 
effort to meet individually with various IOC members, thus propelling the London bid to 
victory despite its underdog status.60 Vladimir Putin, in the bid process for the 2014 
Winter Olympics, was an active member of the bid process. During the Sochi 
presentation Putin sat with the Russian delegation at the IOC session in Guatemala, and 
vehemently supported the Sochi Committee’s efforts.61 Without the support of Putin the 
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first time Sochi bid could not have overcome the strong competition coming from 
traditionally successful winter venues like, Salzburg, Austria.62 The politicization of the 
selection process originated with Lewald and his savvy use of political figures like, the 
German President Paul von Hindenburg and German ambassadors. In the years following 
1936, the bid process remained very political with bid committees attempting to utilize 
prominent international figures and political attitudes like the Los Angeles Committee for 
the 1976 Olympics. As time progressed into the new millennium, the force of power 
politics came to the forefront of candidate strategies with the success of London 2012 and 
Sochi 2014.    
Lewald’s unofficial campaigning efforts during the selection process also opened 
the door for corruption within the Olympic selection process which has significantly 
shaped the formation of the process as it is known today. The largest and most public 
corruption scandal from the post 1936 era of the Olympics occurred over the IOC’s host 
selection of the 2002 Olympic Winter Games held in Salt Lake City. Previously, many 
instances of corruption passed by without much public knowledge, like the bribery during 
the Nixon administration. In contrast the Salt Lake City scandal erupted very publicly on 
November 24, 1998 when a Salt Lake City television station broke the news that the Salt 
Lake Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) continuously payed for Sonia Essomba’s 
tuition, rent, and expenses at the American University, a bill that totaled approximately 
$108,350.63 Sonia Essomba was the daughter of René Essomba, an IOC member from 
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Cameroon. After news of the bribery of Essomba, further investigation into the SLOOC 
revealed numerous additional instances of bribery far exceeding the gifts limits set by the 
IOC. In 1991 the SLOOC and the Salt Lake Bid Committee (SLBC) developed a 
“scholarship assistance” effort which provided $400,000 worth of aid to thirteen students, 
six of which were closely related to IOC members.64 The SLOC’s financial aid program 
only began to reveal the extent of the gifts and services doled out by SLOOC 
representatives to secure IOC votes. In total the IOC expelled six members, and four 
more resigned of their own volition, for accepting gifts and other financial benefits from 
the SLOOC exceeding the $200 limit.65 The worst offender was the IOC member from 
the Republic of the Congo, Jean-Claude Ganga. In addition to a $60,000 profit made off 
of a sale of land orchestrated by a SLOOC and $70,010 of direct payments, Ganga visited 
Salt Lake City six separate times incurring over $115,000 worth of travel expenses paid 
for by the SLOCO.66 During Ganga’s visits himself and members of his family received 
medical treatments worth $28,000 for free.67 Although Ganga capitalized on the 
generosity of the SLOOC and SLBC the other members expelled from the IOC received 
similar types of compensation for their votes in favor of Salt Lake City.  
The actions of the SLOOC were not an isolated incident. The practice of bribing 
IOC members was established years prior. After the Salt Lake City debacle, the IOC 
investigated the Olympic Games of years past and uncovered uncouth behavior from a 
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whole host of IOC members. Lewald’s friendly persuasion of his fellow IOC members 
did not reach the level of bribery, but his persuasive innovations led to corruption within 
the IOC. The bribery of IOC officials originated from intense competitive culture of the 
selection process, created by Theodor Lewald in the 1930s in combination with the 
commercialization of the Olympic Games in the 1980s. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic 
Games were the first to turn a profit with no government debt, and the profitability of the 
IOC and the host cities increased temptations to engage in corrupt behavior.  Through the 
investigation prompted by the Salt Lake City scandal the scrutiny uncovered actions like 
Amsterdam’s guilt in supplying IOC members with gifts like prostitutes, jewelry, and 
VCRs in hopes of obtaining the 1992 Olympics bid.68 Other cities’ indiscretions came to 
light as well. Nagano, Japan hosted various members of the IOC sixty-two times and 
spent an average of Can$33,000 per visit to secure votes for the 1998 Winter Olympics. 
Atlanta, the 1996 host, also admitted to gifting IOC members sets of $475 golf clubs, 
providing free trips to Disney World, and paying for extra first-class airline tickets.69 In 
response to intense international criticism, disappointment, and anger over corruption the 
IOC overhauled the bidding process. To begin the IOC established an independent Ethics 
Commission in 1999 to create a code of ethics and oversee the bid process.70 The IOC 
then created a second group named the IOC 2000 Commission, which was tasked with 
researching avenues for reform and providing recommendations of how the Olympic 
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Movement should be structured going into the new millennium.71 After a vote of the IOC, 
fifty recommendations submitted by the IOC 2000 Commission were adopted. The most 
important changes to the selection process included, the prohibition of IOC members 
from traveling to the bid cities, the creation of an impartial Evaluation Commission 
responsible for visiting bid cities, and the admission of press and media into IOC sessions 
in order to increase transparency.72  
The current bid process adopted in 2014 revised the selection process even more 
for the purpose of providing more aid and dialogue between the IOC and candidate cities. 
The process, now very regimented at every step includes an informal Invitation Phase 
followed by a three-part Candidature Process aimed at looking into the specialized needs 
and challenges of each host candidate.73 The mature selection process of the current 
Olympic Games resulted from a progression of campaigning tactics employed by 
Theodor Lewald for the first time in 1936, which politicized the selection process and 
eventually became rife with corruption. Although the IOC attempted to limit corruption 
within the process, the presence of politics within the bid became a naturalized aspect of 
the long journey to hosting.   
 
The Boycott Movement 
The 1936 Berlin Olympics experienced threats of boycott from Western 
democracies adding to the significance of the 1936 Olympics in the development of the 
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modern Olympic Games. As David Clay Large observes in his book Nazi Games: The 
Olympics of 1936, “In 1936, for the first time in modern Olympic history, a protest 
movement of international scope was mounted against a designated host city, Berlin.”74 
The 1936 Olympics were a vessel through which the international community sought 
political change, a trend which became a prevalent aspect of subsequent Games. 
The Berlin Games were not boycotted from the outset of their selection. After the 
cancellation of the 1916 Berlin Games after World War I, Theodor Lewald, a German 
member of the IOC, tirelessly campaigned to bring the Olympic Games to Berlin. The 
efforts of Lewald came to fruition on May 13, 1931 when IOC president Henri de Baillet-
Latour revealed that Berlin received more votes than its competitor Barcelona to become 
the host of the 1936 Olympics.75 At the moment of Berlin’s selection the Weimar 
Republic, a parliamentary Republic, governed the post-war German state.76 Unbeknownst 
to the world and the IOC during the selection process in 1931, in January of 1933 
President Paul von Hindenburg would appoint Adolf Hitler to the chancellorship and 
effectively hold open the door for Hitler to usher in the Third Reich.77 During the rise of 
the National Socialist German Worker’s Party, the members of the international 
community turned their eyes warily towards the new regime to see what was to happen 
when, as the American journalist George Gerhard from the North American Review 
phrased it, “Herr Hitler comes to bat.”78  When Hitler and the Nazi Party gained complete 
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control of the German government much of the world already knew about their racially 
exclusionary policies. The Nazis’ published political platform of twenty-five points 
offered a transparent look into the party’s intentions from as early as 1920. One of the 
most concerning Nazi political promises in the eyes of the international community was 
the fourth point in Hitler’s program. It read, “Only a national comrade can be a citizen. 
Only someone of German blood, regardless of faith, can be a citizen. Therefore, no Jew 
can be a citizen.”79 From 1933-35 the discrimination against Jews and other minorities 
escalated under the influence of Nazi politics and drew great concern from the IOC and 
many individual countries about sending teams to Berlin in 1936.  The spirit of 
conscientious objection in relation to the Third Reich’s policies manifested through the 
threat to boycott the Berlin Games.  While sentiments leaning towards boycotts existed in 
multiple countries, including England and France, the boycott effort in the United States 
proved the most threatening.80  
Soon after Hitler’s ascent to power in January of 1933 the anxieties of the IOC 
regarding the Nazis’ treatment of German Jews proved to be substantiated. In June 1933 
Jewish athletes were prohibited from joining sports organizations and were banned from 
many sports facilities. The exclusion of Jews from sports violated the laws of the 
Olympic Games stating there should be no discrimination in the Games on the basis of 
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race or religion.81 In addition, Theodor Lewald lost his position as President of the 
German Olympic Committee (GOC) because of a Jewish relative and was replaced by the 
Nazi Party member Hans von Tschammer und Osten.82 In response, at the next annual 
IOC meeting in Vienna on June 7, 1933 the American IOC officials Charles Sherrill and 
William May Garland grilled the German IOC officials, Lewald and Karl Ritter von Halt 
about Jewish discrimination in German sport. By the end of the session Lewald and von 
Halt obtained a written statement from the Reich Interior Ministry stating, “All the laws 
regulating the Olympic Games shall be observed. As a principle German Jews will not be 
excluded from German Teams at the Games of the XIth Olympiad.”83 Lewald was also 
reinstated to a lower position on the GOC. Satisfied with the written guarantee and 
ceremonial appointment of Lewald, Sherrill and Garland returned to the United States 
quite pleased with themselves and the word of the Reich Interior Ministry.    
  Despite Sherrill’s satisfaction with the 1933 IOC session in Vienna, American 
organizations like the American Jewish Congress (AJC), the Amateur Athletic Union 
(AAU), and the American Olympic Association (AOA, and sometimes referred to as the 
American Olympic Committee) doubted the sincerity of the assurances given in Vienna. 
The boycott in the United States was largely initiated by the AAU. The organization 
pressed the AOA to withdraw American participation from the 1936 Games if Hitler did 
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not reverse his discriminatory policies towards Jews.84 In November of 1933 Gustavus 
Town Kirby presented a resolution to the AAU, which was then adopted, unambiguously 
threatening to withdraw American participation from the Games should discriminatory 
policies remain unchanged. Kirby also presented his resolution to Sherill and the AOA, 
but encountered resistance from Sherill who found Lewald’s promises of change 
sufficient.85 In a compromise, the AOA passed a resolution with the same intent as the 
AAU resolution, but “the threat was toned down.”86  
The American boycott movement may very well have been successful if it had not 
been for one man, Avery Brundage, the president of the AOA. Brundage’s efforts in 1934 
and 1935 swayed the AOA to vote in favor of American participation in the 1936 
Olympics. Initially, Brundage vehemently expressed his distaste for discrimination in the 
Olympics during an interview with the Baltimore Jewish Times in April of 1933, where 
he stated, “the Games will not be held in any country where there will be interference 
with the fundamental Olympic theory of equality of all races.”87 By 1934 the leadership 
of the AOA remained uncertain Hitler and the Nazi government would honor their 
commitment made in Vienna the year before. In June of 1934 the AOA voted to postpone 
accepting the German invitation to Berlin until Avery Brundage conducted an official 
investigation into the treatment of German Jewish athletes. Brundage agreed to the 
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investigation and within the month he and his wife set sail for Europe. Brundage carried 
out his investigation with as much conviction as a Division I Southeastern Conference 
football coach looking into allegations of misconduct against their star player. Brundage 
never thoroughly investigated the treatment of Jewish athletes without Reich influence. 
For example, while conducting the inquiry an appointed translator accompanied him at 
all times and he was unable to interview representatives from Jewish sports club without 
supervision.88 In addition, Brundage’s friendships with Theodor Lewald, Carl Diem, and 
Karl Ritter von Halt made him sympathetic towards the organizers and more inclined to 
take their assurances on faith.89 While in Germany Brundage also met with the 
Reichssportfuhrer Hans von Tschammer und Osten who once again assured Brundage 
that Jewish athletes would be allowed to compete on the German Olympic team. 
Brundage returned to the United States and presented the AOA a glowing report of the 
Nazi commitment to repeal discriminatory practices. At the meeting of the AOA in 
September 1934 the association unanimously voted to accept the German invitation to the 
1936 Games.90 Kirby, initially a strong opponent to participation, addressed the 
committee, including President Brundage, and said, “Mr. President, we have every  right 
to believe from your report that Germany will not dare recede from the position she has 
taken.”91  
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The AOA may have been convinced by Brundage and his questionable 
investigation, but the matter of American participation was not completely settled until 
the AAU voted in favor of participation in December of 1935. The AAU in the first half 
of the twentieth century heavily involved itself with the AOA and certified all track and 
field athletes for the United States’ Olympic Team.92 Thus AAU acceptance of 
participation became a necessary component to send a large and skilled USA team to the 
Olympics. On December 9, 1935, only eight months away from the Summer 
competitions and only two months away from the Winter Games, the AAU voted against 
a boycott in a very close decision with only a margin of about three votes.93 The 
reasoning behind participation was based on trusting assurances from German officials 
that German Jewish athletes would not be discriminated against in the Olympic Games. 
The American boycott nearly succeeded, but once the AAU decided against boycotting 
the Games, the oppositional sentiment around the world ceased as well.  
Abuses against German Jews in general within Germany were seen by Brundage 
and other members of the important Olympic governing bodies as private political 
matters of Germany not to be intervened in by Olympic Committees.94 However, despite 
Brundage’s reluctance to interfere in German politics one must wonder how he, and 
others who voted to send Americans to Berlin, believed the promises by German officials 
like Lewald, Ritter, and von Tschammer. Brundage and other politically up to date 
Americans would have been aware of the abuses against German Jews. Only about a year 
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after Brundage’s visit, on September 15, 1935 Hitler passed the Nuremberg Laws. The 
legislation made interracial relationships between Jews and “Aryans” illegal, stripped 
Jews of their citizenship, and defined a Jew as any person with three or four Jewish 
grandparents.95 American newspapers, like the New York Times followed the developing 
situation in Germany and reported on the escalation of German policy. Men like 
Brundage would have been aware of what was happening in Germany as headlines such 
as, “Anti-Jewish Laws Passed” and “Non-Aryans Deprived of Citizenship and Right to 
Intermarry” peppered the front pages of newspapers across the country.96 Given the 
Olympic officials’ knowledge of the escalation of racially discriminatory laws it is 
illuminating that Brundage and other AAU members communicated confidence about the 
assurances they received. Brundage and others’ choice to ignore the news of escalating 
racial discrimination coming out of Germany displays the intense desire of the Olympic 
administrators to hold on to the apolitical and peacekeeping façade of the Olympic 
Games.  
Despite Brundage and the decision of the AOA’s and AAU to send an American 
team to Berlin, there were many individual athletes from around the world who chose to 
sit out of the Berlin Games. However, it should be noted that the personal boycotters did 
not represent a large number of athletes. Never before had the Olympic Games seen such 
a large number of individual athletes abstain from Olympic competition out of protest. 
One athlete who stayed home in 1936 was the Jewish Romanian fencer Endre Altman. 
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He explained his decision saying, “I refused to go Berlin…it was a stand of solidarity 
with what was happening to them, German Jews... The Olympics didn’t lose much by me 
not participating, but it is my satisfaction.”97 Altman’s reasons reflected the sentiment of 
a number of other athletes who chose not to go to Berlin. The personal boycotters were 
primarily Jewish athletes. Other notable boycotters included three American track 
runners, Canada’s number one light weight boxer Yisrael (“Sammy”) Luftspring, a 
French bobsledder, and three of Austria’s top ranked swimmers.98 The personal boycotts 
by Jewish athletes signified a new era of the Olympic Games. Conscientious objection by 
Jewish athletes regarding the discrimination of German Jews turned the Olympic Games 
into a political stage. By staging this boycott, the athletes set a moral precedent asserting 
that participating in the Games represented a tacit endorsement of the host nation.  
The boycott movement of the Olympic Games has become a staple of the modern 
Olympic Games after its first use in 1936. Although zero nations went through with a 
boycott of the German Games, the 1936 the boycott movement established a powerful 
option nations used in later years. Olympic participation became a way to voice concerns 
about international politics and came to be understood as the acceptance of the domestic 
and foreign policies of host nations, and even other participating nations. Throughout the 
rest of the century the concept of boycotting persisted and evolved. The significant years 
that experienced boycotting included 1956, 1964, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988. Boycotts 
were held for a variety of reasons, including the protest of apartheid era South Africa, 
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Chinese-Taiwan relations, and Cold War era fear.  However, the boycott of the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games, because of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan, best illustrates the politicizing impact of the near boycotts in 1936 on 
Olympic ideology. In Jimmy Carter’s address to representatives of the United States’ 
Olympic team set to go to Moscow, he touched on the legitimizing action of participating 
in the Olympic Games:  
The Olympics are important to the Soviet Union. They [Soviet Union] have made 
massive investments in buildings, equipment, propaganda. As has probably 
already been pointed out to you, they have passed hundreds of thousands of 
copies of an official Soviet document saying that the decision of the world 
community to hold the Olympics in Moscow is an acknowledgement of approval 
of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and proof to the world that the Soviet’s 
policy results in international peace.99 
 
Carter’s observations of the value of the Olympic Games to the Soviet Union’s political 
ambitions highlights assumptions about Olympic participation that stem from Berlin in 
1936. Just like many of the unsuccessful American boycotters in 1936 Carter saw the 
participation of the United States as an action enabling a government to continue human 
rights abuses. The feeling of a moral responsibility to object to abusive host governments 
was also heightened by hindsight and the knowledge of the atrocities that followed the 
Berlin Games. The political implications of the decision to participate in the Olympics 
are also illustrated by the deciding body in the 1980 case. In 1936 the AAU and AOA 
made the decision to participate in Berlin, and the President of the United States, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, stayed completely out of the controversy.100 However, in 1980 the 
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President made the decision as an act of United States foreign policy, indicating the 
politicized nature of the decision. The assumptions present in Carter’s address were not 
just indicative of the United States’ perception of the Olympic Games. Seventy-nine 
other nations boycotted the Games along with the Americans. Although around forty-five 
to fifty most likely followed the lead of the United States in boycotting the Soviets.101 
After the Cold War instances of successful boycotts reduced partially due to the lack of 
efficacy of the boycotts to create change. 
Even though after the Cold War the boycotts subsided, the political implications 
of what it meant to accept an invitation to the Olympics persisted. The most notable 
example in the twentieth century was the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympiad. Although all 
nations invited accepted their invitation, the thought of boycott hung in the air leading up 
to the Games. Part of China’s platform during the bidding process, and one of the reasons 
they secured the bid, was a promise to address human rights concerns within the 
country.102 Among other reasons, the international community was alarmed by China’s 
involvement in the Darfur and Myanmar conflicts as well as China’s position on Tibet. 
As the 2008 Olympic Games quickly approached many international organizations found 
Chinese attempts at compliance with their promises made during the bid process less than 
convincing. The American non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch 
reported, “thus far, Beijing’s compliance with its own promises and international 
                                                        
101 “Moscow 1980,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 31, 2017, 
https://www.olympic.org/moscow-1980. 
102 Aaron Beacom, International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New 
Mediators (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 196. 
 40 
expectations has been abysmal.”103 Given China’s relative non-compliance with its 
human rights promises the question of a boycott came to the forefront of international 
thought. Protests broke out across London, Paris, and the United States with prominent 
political figures like the French Presidential candidate Segolene Royal advocating for 
boycotts.104105 By the start of the Games on 2008 all invited nations sent teams to Beijing 
as many nations saw a boycott as an ineffective way to address concerns with the Chinese 
government. Also, the potential economic profit many international businesses stood to 
gain from the Olympics tempered the possibility of a boycott as well.106 Although no 
nation abstained from participation, various world leaders such as German President 
Angela Merkel and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy personally boycotted the 
Games in support of Tibet.107 Not every year following the 1936 Games saw a boycott, 
but the ideological legacy left by the boycott effort in the early 1930s nonetheless 
persisted and has become an inseparable aspect of the Olympic Games.  
The concern about human rights violations and Hitler’s worrying policies within 
the Third Reich stirred up anti-Nazi sentiment and raised questions about the need for 
international intervention in the Third Reich. Despite the apolitical rhetoric surrounding 
the Olympic movement pushed by some of its most influential leaders like, Henry 
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Baillet-Latour and Avery Brundage, participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics was a 
political act. In the AAU session in December 1935 that decided the issue of American 
participation in Berlin the resolution on the table stated, “participation must not be taken 
to imply endorsement of the principles or practices of the Nazi government.”108 However, 
by attending the Games, the United States and the rest of Europe tacitly supported the 
legitimacy of the Nazi regime. Although one can only speculate on what would have 
happened had multiple countries boycotted the 1936 Games, it seems reasonable to 
categorize the 1936 Berlin Olympics as another instance of appeasement in the notorious 
decade of the 1930s. The complicity of the international community in the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics left a lasting feeling of political responsibility for the actions of the Third Reich 
after 1936 that presented itself in efforts to boycott human rights abuses in subsequent 
Olympiads. After the 1936 Olympics, accepting an invitation to the Olympic Games 
became a symbol of acquiescence to the international and domestic policies of the host 
nation. The political weight inherent in the acceptance of an Olympic invitation is a 
modern phenomenon of the modern Olympic Games that began with the 1936 Olympics. 
Theodor Lewald and the journey to Berlin in 1936 set new precedents with great 
implications to the Olympic movement. Lewald’s strategy to win the Olympic bid 
employed methods of persuasion never before used by host cities and inspired Olympic 
bid advocates following him. The German IOC member’s use politics and persuasion of 
IOC members for votes heightened the competitive nature of the selection process. The 
intensified process of 1936 established the norm of using national political positions to 
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ensnare IOC votes. Then, when the Olympics became profitable in the 1980s, the 
diplomatic persuasion turned into corruption. The boycott efforts in the 1930s from 
around the world, especially the United States, altered the Olympic selection process 
irrevocably. Not only did host cities have to make it past the selection process of the IOC, 
but beginning in 1936 host cities and the national governments associated with them had 
to endure an informal vetting process conducted by the international court of public 
opinion. The unofficial application to the international community’s acceptance is an 
inextricable facet of the modern Olympic Games. The politicized selection process and 
the international boycott in the 1930s were factors that made the 1936 Olympics truly 
modern. 
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Government Interest in Olympic Outcomes 
 The revived Olympic Games were never completely separated from government 
political interests. In theory the Olympics were created as an apolitical celebration of the 
triumph of the human spirit and a showcase for athletic achievement. Olympism, a term 
coined by Pierre de Coubertin, is defined as: 
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting, and combining in a balanced whole 
the qualities of body will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, 
Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational 
value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal 
fundamental ethical principles.109 
 
Olympism and the Olympic Movement believe in the power of sport to bring nations, 
races, and religions together to compete without thought of their differences. However, 
Coubertin’s Games were easily influenced by the whims of nationalistic governments and 
political conditions of the day from the start. In the years leading up to the grand political 
spectacle of the 1936 Berlin Olympics the international sporting festival was colored by 
international politics.  The 1896 Athens Olympics experienced the sensitivity of 
international relations when the Germans almost decided to reject their invitation to 
participate after what they believed to be a slight from Coubertin and the IOC. The 
Germans were miffed because they were not invited to the Sorbonne Congress in 1894 
when the IOC was created and the Congress decided to revive the Olympic Games.110 
Representatives from every other notable European power attended the Congress in Paris. 
The Germans, despite the slight, still sent a small team to Athens.111  
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The 1900 Paris Olympics were markedly lacking any political conflict or slights. 
The absence of any international controversy was most likely a product of the 
unenthusiastic organization of the Games by the World’s Fair organizers. The Exposition 
greatly overshadowed the Olympic competition and some athletes did not even know 
they had competed in an Olympiad until they looked at the Olympic inscription on their 
medals.112 The Olympics by 1900 did not possess much international clout. Similar to 
1896 in Athens, the 1904 Olympic Games in St. Louis also experienced the slight touch 
of the hand of international politics. Coubertin, despite his great investment in the 
Olympic Movement, decided to remain in France during the Games. The Frenchman 
refused to travel to the third Olympiad because the World’s Fair in St. Louis celebrated 
the Louisiana Purchase from the French.113 To Coubertin the Louisiana Purchase 
symbolized French weakness, and the American celebration was insulting to the 
Frenchman. At the 1908 London Games nationalism was a naturalized part of the 
Olympic Games. The perfect example of the government involvement in the early 
Olympic Games was the marathon in 1908. Originally only 26 miles long, the distance of 
the marathon was changed to the current standard of 26.2 miles for the London Games. 
The change was compelled by the wishes of the British monarchy. King Edward and 
Queen Alexandria requested the marathon start on their property, Windsor Castle, and 
finish at the Royal Box in the Stadium which added an extra 385 yards to the race.114 
Aside from the active presence of the British monarchy the 1908 Olympic Games were 
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also filled with political sensitivity, mostly from the Americans. After arriving in London 
the American team, unsatisfied with the lodgings provided to them, viewed the sub-par 
accommodations as an intended offense.115 The opening ceremonies proved to be 
politically charged by competing nationalistic slights. The British chose not to fly the 
American flag in the stadium. In  response the American flag bearer did not lower the 
flag in the presence of the British monarchs present at the ceremony as was the custom.116  
Stockholm in 1912 also felt the weight of international politics. Nationalist 
enthusiasm over the Games permeated the Olympic atmosphere as the press obsessively 
tallied medal counts of the participating nations to declare a winner.117 Besides the 
characteristic nationalism engrained in the Olympic Games global politics also intruded 
on the 1912 Games. Tensions between Finland and Russia flared in Stockholm. In 1912 
Finland was forced to compete under the Russian flag, and much to the annoyance of the 
Russians, marched in the opening ceremonies with their own flag.118 In the closing 
ceremonies of the Stockholm Games, although Berlin’s bid for the 1916 Olympics was 
not yet official, the Olympic torch passed from Sweden to Germany.119 Prior to the 1936 
Olympics, the 1916 Berlin Games were the most impacted by world politics. Due to the 
outbreak of World War I the IOC cancelled the Games in 1915 and decided not to 
transfer the Games to another city. Despite the cancellation of the 1916 Games the 
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Olympiad still counted as the VI Olympiad because according to Coubertin, “An 
Olympiad may fail to be celebrated; its number remains. This is the ancient tradition.”120  
After World War I, much like the rest of the world, the Olympic Games did not 
escape the political consequences of the largest military conflict the world had ever seen. 
The first Olympics after the war were held in Antwerp during 1920.  The Antwerp Games 
and the following Paris Games in 1924 did not experience political tension during the 
Games. The most notable aspect of the 1920 and 1924 Olympics were the noticeable 
absences of Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Austria, and Bulgaria. The nations that 
composed the Central Powers in World War I did not receive an invitation to Antwerp or 
Paris because of their role in World War I.121 The punitive decision to exclude nations 
from the Olympic Games based on the disapproval of the international community 
indicated a new political ideal attached to the Olympics in the aftermath of World War I. 
The same trend would be followed after World War II by forbidding the participation of 
the former Axis Powers in the 1948 London Olympics.122 The Olympic Games became 
an indicator of the governmental legitimacy of participating nations.123 The ideal of the 
Olympics as a legitimizing force greatly influenced the recently appointed Nazi leaders 
over ten years later when they received their chance to host the Olympics. The 1920 
Games also marked the first year the newly formed USSR decided to abstain from the 
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Games because of the new government’s disinterest in the international sporting 
festival.124 The USSR abstained from Olympic competition until 1952.  
The 1928 Games in Amsterdam experienced minimal international tension, but 
gained significance because the former Central Powers were invited to the Olympic 
Games for the first time since the war.125 Finally, the 1932 Games in Los Angeles also 
possessed an air of political congeniality like the Olympic Games of the 1920s. The crash 
of the United States stock market and the subsequent world depression implanted itself at 
the front of the international focus in 1932, consequently pushing out political conflict.126       
The Olympic Games were never the apolitical international event of Coubertin’s 
dreams. Rather from their start they reflected the political climate of the time they 
occupied. If the Olympics prior to the 1936 Games were influenced by politics and 
nationalism, then what made the 1936 Berlin Olympics different? The 1936 Berlin 
Olympics are set apart from its predecessors because the Games were actively used as a 
tool of political manipulation by national governments whereas previous Games were 
simply reflective of political climates and governmental attitudes. 1936 was a watershed 
moment for the Olympic Games because it revealed the potential for the Games to enact 
political change, for better or worse. Throughout the course of Olympic preparation and 
the Games themselves the Nazis successfully pushed their own political narrative of 
“Aryan” superiority. By the end of the 1936 Olympics the Germans walked away with 
the most Olympic medals. With eighty-nine medals in total the Germans beat the rest of 
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the world, including the Americans who came in second with fifty-six.127 Not only did 
the Germans win total medal count but the German Olympic team came away with the 
most gold medals as well. In 1936 Germany won thirty-three gold medals with the 
Americans coming in second with a total of twenty-four.128 Hitler’s efforts to 
demonstrate the strength of the ‘Aryan’ German people through control of the Olympics 
succeeded and set a precedent for government meddling in sport, specifically the 
Olympics. The Nazis’ triumph in 1936 brought about the politicization of sport within 
nations and demonstrated the possibility of transforming Olympic Games into a fanfare 
of propaganda. 
 
“Aryanization” of Sport Within Germany 
 Another area of the Olympic Games the Nazis politicized was sport within 
German borders. Hitler and the Nazi regime injected the government’s “Aryan” ideal into 
every level of sport in Germany. Historically, sport in the German lands was closely 
associated with nationalism. The militarized gymnastic style, known as Turnen, 
developed in the early nineteenth century in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars. The 
creator Ludwig Jahn viewed the new form of physical exercise as a way to “unify the 
divided German Volk and to drive the hated Napoleonic invaders from sacred German 
soil”.129 Turnen’s main goal was “national education and military readiness.”130 By the 
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start of World War I, Turnen was the main form of physical activity taught in schools and 
boasted the largest number of sports organizations in Germany.131 However given 
Turnen’s military purpose, the German defeat in World War I led to a decrease in the 
prominence of the exercise form and a rise in the popularity of the British conception of 
sport.132 Throughout the 1920s Weimar era sport increased in popularity and by 1928 
when the Germans were invited back to the Olympics the Weimar government propelled 
German sport forward by investing in proper facilities.133 
By the 1930s German sport established itself as one of the elite athletic powers of 
the world. In the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics the Germans came in second behind the 
Americans.134 The rise of the Nazis, called into question the future of German 
participation in international sports. Hitler’s interest in sport prior to hosting the 
Olympics stemmed from racialized ideals of a German state. In Mein Kampf, he writes, 
“The State that is grounded on the racial principle and is alive to the significance of this 
truth will first of all have to base its educational work not on the mere imparting of 
knowledge but rather on physical training and development of healthy bodies.”135 Hitler 
believed the value of sport stemmed from its ability to create a physically strong “Aryan” 
German state. Hitler disliked the idea of pure “Aryans” competing with lesser races, and 
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especially disliked the Olympics which he characterized as “a plot by freemasons and 
Jews.”136  
Once Hitler and the Nazis came to power in 1933 Theodor Lewald managed to 
obtain Hitler’s approval to move forward with the Olympic Games and Goebbels’ pledge 
to handle publicity for the Games personally.137 The 1936 Berlin Olympics presented a 
unique propaganda opportunity for the Third Reich  and the Nazis seized on it 
immediately. The Nazis started by inserting themselves into the planning process. Host 
governments of previous Olympics often cooperated with organizing committees, but the 
Nazis in 1936 surpassed cooperation and delved into the realm of cooptation. The Nazis 
assumed complete control of the planning operations. After news of Theodor Lewald’s 
Jewish ancestry came out the Nazis demoted him from his position on the Organizing 
Committee. However, after the protestations of the IOC, Lewald received a mostly 
ceremonial reinstatement. As a condition of continued participation “He [Lewald] signed 
a secret Interior Ministry document stating that while the GOC retained the authority to 
deal directly with the IOC, Germany’s Olympic organizers must defer to Reich officials 
‘in all essential matters of policy’. The GOC’s ‘independence’ therefore, was purely for 
show.”138 The Nazis successfully infiltrated the GOC and set Lewald up as a puppet to 
carry out the wishes of the Third Reich.  
Despite the secrecy of the statement Lewald signed, the makeup of the GOC was 
a very visible indicator of the heavy involvement of the Nazis in the planning of the 
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Olympic Games. Of the 47 members of the Organizing Committee forty members came 
from a variety of governmental departments.139 Six represented the Reich Ministry for 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, five came from the Reich War Ministry (not 
including the many decorated members of the German military on the committee), four 
were from the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, and the rest represented a 
variety of ministries from finance to transportation.140 To compare, the Los Angeles 
Summer Olympics in 1932 boasted only 29 members on the Organizing Committee with 
zero members holding any sort of position within the federal government.141 The 
Organizing Committee for the 1932 Games consisted mostly of Los Angeles business 
leaders and attorneys motivated by a desire to develop the Los Angeles area. The most 
politically connected of the members previously held elected offices in the Los Angeles 
Chamber of Commerce.142 The Nazi government’s insertion of government officials into 
the  Organizing Committee gave the Nazis complete control over the planning process, an 
abnormality in the history of the Olympics prior to 1936. 
Aside from creating a Nazi controlled Olympic organizing committee, Hitler 
“Aryanized” sport throughout Germany as well. Starting in 1933 sports clubs in Germany 
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adopted the “Aryan paragraph,” a policy banning the membership of Jews.143 The 
German Olympic team, like the private sports clubs, was no different. Hitler’s 1936 
Games were meant to showcase the success and dominance of the “Aryan” race. Jews on 
the Olympic team ran counter to this goal. Despite giving assurances to the international 
community that German Jews would not be discriminated against in the formation of the 
Olympic team, only two Jews were accepted on the German Olympic team as a way to 
appease the international community. In an interview conducted by the USC Shoah 
Foundation, the Jewish high jumper Gretel Bergmann (now Margaret Lambert) recalls 
her experience on the German Olympic team. In the interview Bergman says that even 
though she was on the Olympic team she was barred from all the training facilities except 
for when the time came for Olympic trials.144 The only other Jewish athlete on the 
Olympic team in the summer of 1936, and the only Jew allowed to compete in the 
Summer Games, was a fencer named Helene Mayer. The process of “Aryanization” in 
German sport is not in itself indicative of the Olympic movement in the postwar years. 
Rather, the success of the 1936 Olympic Games set a precedent of government 
involvement in Olympiads.  
 The 1936 Berlin Olympics created a trend of increased government intervention 
in the administration of sport and Olympic teams in the years that followed. While the 
infiltration of the Olympics by a government did not reach the level of extremity of the 
Nazis’ 1936 Games in each Olympiad, the same type of government involvement in the 
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success of a nation’s Olympic athletes certainly became a common sight. The Nazis 
exercised the power of the government to control which athletes made the German 
Olympic team and push their racialized agenda through sport. A similar example of 
attempts by national governments to control sport within its borders and push a 
nationalistic agenda is the prevalence of state sponsored doping. National governments 
providing performance enhancing drugs to athletes, reflects the same effort to push a 
national agenda through government control of sport as the Nazis’ “Aryanization” efforts 
in the 1930s. Spurred by the heightened feelings of nationalism following World War II 
and the beginning of the Cold War, the Olympics became another outlet for nations to 
assert their dominance on the world stage much like the proxy wars in Korea and 
Vietnam. One of the most extensive state doping efforts in Olympic history was the 
German Democratic Republic. Beginning around 1975 the German Democratic Republic 
systematically drugged an estimated 10,000 athletes over a number of years.145 Many 
athletes did not know they were being given performance enhancing drugs, while others 
were forced into consuming the drugs.146 Aside from the 1970s German Democratic 
Republic Olympic team, the Soviet Union and more generally, the whole Soviet-bloc, 
“actively promoted the use of performance enhancement” during the Cold War.147  
The presence of state sponsored doping was not simply isolated to the Cold War 
years. Most recently, a 2016 investigation into the Russian Olympic team revealed one of 
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the most prolific doping cover up operations in Olympic History. The McLaren Report, 
the document reporting the findings of the official investigation found, “There was a 
program of doping and doping cover up in Russia, which may have been engaged in to 
enhance the image of Russia through sport. That doping manipulation and cover up of 
doping control processes was institutionalized through government officials… as well as 
sport official and coaches.”148 Once again the desire to achieve nationalistic aims through 
domination in sport and the Olympic Games prompted government involvement in the 
development of Olympic teams. The propensity for extreme government control exerted 
over the development of a nation’s Olympic program originated in 1936 Berlin. 
Another example of government manipulation of sport within its borders was the 
scandal surrounding the Chinese gymnastics team. Similar to the “Aryanization” and 
doping scandals, the Chinese government falsified the ages of gymnastic participants 
with the hope of gaining a leg up on the international competition. In the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics, the Chinese gymnast and bronze medalist, Yang Yun, provided documentation 
to Olympic Officials stating she was sixteen, the minimum age for gymnastic 
competition. Following the Games, Yun stated in an interview that she was only fourteen 
during the Sydney Games, and received instructions to lie about her age.149 Records from 
before the 2000 Olympics supported Yun’s assertion. The Chinese gymnastics team age 
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suspicions surfaced again at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In 2008 Olympic gymnastics 
officials raised questions about not just one Chinese participant, but three. Once again, 
the gymnasts’ passports maintained they were sixteen, but given the falsification of 
Yun’s records in 2000 many like, the lead women’s gymnastics authority, Bela Karolyi, 
remained unconvinced.150 The underage Chinese gymnastics team reflects the common 
desperate measures taken by a government to ensure success and nationalistic glory in the 
Olympic Games.     
Government supervision and control of the Olympic planning process was another 
legacy of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Since 1936 many Olympic Games since have been 
coopted by governments eager to seize the unique propaganda opportunity the Olympic 
Games provide. An excellent case study of the trend can be seen from some of the Games 
of the new millennium. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, despite the supposed 
independence of National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and Organizing Committees, 
turned into the passion project of Russia’s authoritarian ruler, Vladimir Putin. From start 
to finish Putin and the Russian government played a large part in the entire Olympic 
process. The Russian President involved himself in every aspect from the selection of the 
desired host city, which typically was the responsibility of the NOC, to the construction 
of facilities.151 During the entire seven year process Putin did everything from advocate 
for Sochi with the IOC in the bid process to plan the construction of the Olympic venues. 
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Putin’s involvement in the Olympic planning process stemmed from a desire for a 
“public relations triumph” to uplift Russia in the eyes of the international community. 
The Russian President’s spare no expense attitude towards the Winter Games, along with 
allegations of the government skimming off the top of the Olympic funds, produced the 
most expensive Olympics ever.152  The supposed final tab came in at an estimated $51 
billion, with most of the expenses falling on the shoulders of Russian taxpayers.153 The 
transformation of the 2014 Winter Games into Vladimir Putin’s pet project presents an 
extremely blatant case of government involvement in the planning process of the Games.  
Although not every national government went to such lengths as state sponsored 
doping or the coopting of the planning of the Games like in Sochi, government 
involvement could not be removed from the financing of the Olympic Games after 1936. 
Given the Olympic Games’ increasing popularity following the 1936 Olympics, 
government involvement in the execution of the international event became an 
inextricable aspect of the Olympic Games. The climbing size and expenditures for the 
Olympic Games beginning in 1936 Nazis dramatically made the price of hosting the 
Olympic Games skyrocket after World War II. The increase in the cost of hosting made 
the monetary support of the national and city government crucial to financing the 
Olympic Games. From the period between 1956 and 1980 the national government 
provided significant funds to the Organizing Committees and increasingly took on more 
and more financial responsibility. In 1956 Melbourne hosted the XVIth Olympiad. The 
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Organizing Committee secured a promise from the government of the Commonwealth 
and the State of Victoria to provide £200,000 for the Organizing Committee to use in 
case of a deficit. The amount the governments actually ended up contributing totaled 
£300,000.154 The 1964 Tokyo Olympics secured funds from the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government totaling approximately $4,308,333 with some help from the National 
Treasury.155 The cost of the Olympic Games continued to climb with national 
governments taking on a larger role in the financing of the Games. In the 1968 Mexico 
City Olympic Games the Mexican government provided $56,816,000 in subsidies to help 
finance the Olympics.156 The 1976 Summer Olympics in Montréal were the height of 
government financial aid to the Olympic Games. Despite the Organizing Committee’s 
promises to make the Montréal Games self-financing without dependence on the 
Canadian government to cover a deficit, the cost totaled $1,596,000,000 and was the 
most expensive Olympiad up to 1976.157 However, the revenue generated from the 
Games came in significantly under the about 1.5 billion dollar mark. After subtracting the 
revenue made from the Games the deficit totaled about 1 billion dollars.158 The Canadian 
government ended up contributing $142 million, not including the contributions from 
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lower levels of government like, Québec and the City of Montréal, to the Olympic 
cause.159  The total debt of the 1976 Games took thirty years to pay off completely.160 
The 1976 Montréal Olympic Games were the culmination of the worries about the 
unsustainability of the financial cost of the Olympic Games. Montréal caused the 
international community to question whether or not the rising costs of the Olympics 
could be sustained.  
After Montréal, a new era of Olympic financing blossomed. The Olympics were 
given new life through commercialization. After 1976 the Games reached an impasse. 
Either the Organizing Committees found more ways to create revenue to finance the 
Olympic Games, or the costs of hosting would rise too dramatically thus decreasing the 
financial feasibility of any city hosting the Games. The Organizing Committee of the 
1980 Moscow Games successfully budgeted and financed the Olympic Games with the 
Soviet government only financing infrastructure which was incorporated into the State 
Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy.161 Although, it should be 
noted the cost of the desired infrastructure still incurred a high cost. While the 1980 
Olympics reduced need for contributions from the government, the turning point in the 
financial history of the Olympic Games was the 1984 Olympiad in Los Angeles. Prior to 
securing the Olympic bid, the state government of California made clear it had no 
intention to cover any deficits created by the Olympic Games. In 1984 the Los Angeles 
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Olympic Committee managed to “hold an Olympic Games free of government financial 
involvement.”162 The costs of services provided by the state, local, or federal 
governments were all reimbursed by the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee 
resulting in zero costs absorbed by the government.163 However, despite the lessening of 
financial burden placed on the national government of the host nation, logistical 
operations depended on government fronting labor. Also, various Olympic revenue 
sources still relied on government organizations to front the initial costs of revenue 
generating programs such as commemorative stamps, the minting of souvenir coins, and 
Oylmpic Lotteries.   
Over the course of the Olympic history following the 1936 Olympics, government 
involvement in the Olympic Games took different forms such as controlling Olympic 
Team performance, planning and organizing the Olympic Games, and financing the 
growing international spectacle. The Nazis’ efforts to “Aryanize” German sport 
intensified the nationalistic spirit of the Olympic Games and increased the level of 
government investment in Olympic success. The measures taken by subsequent regimes 
like the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, China, Russia demonstrate the 
continuation of the ideology set forth with the “Aryanization” of German sport in the 
1930s.  
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The Games as Propaganda  
 Part of what separated the 1936 Olympics from its predecessors and connected 
1936 with the rest of the century’s Olympic Games was the Nazis’ use of the Olympic 
Games as a giant propaganda opportunity.  The Nazis’ rise to power followed the 
selection of Berlin as the Olympic host. With the uncertainty displayed by the 
international community about the intentions and politics of the new regime in Germany, 
the 1936 Olympic Games provided the perfect opportunity to put international objections 
to rest. Hitler and the Nazis manipulated every aspect and every moment of the 1936 
Games simultaneously to hide the rampant racial discrimination and to praise the strength 
of the “Aryan” Germans. The Nazis recognized the power of the Olympics as a 
legitimizing force within the international community. By successfully hosting and 
letting the world in to the German State the Nazis temporarily put to rest certain 
international concerns and gained political clout on the international stage. Throughout 
the Berlin Games the Nazis walked a very fine line between pushing a racial agenda and 
pretending one did not exist. 
 One of the Nazis’ most striking uses of the public relations potential in the 
Olympics was to hide the reality of Jewish discrimination within the Nazi regime. From 
1933, as evidenced by boycott efforts, the international community took great issue with 
the mistreatment of German Jews and other non- “Aryan” minorities. In response to the 
boycotts the Nazis continually reassured protesting nations, and eventually began the 
elaborate process of hiding signs of discrimination against German Jews from visiting 
foreigners in 1936.   
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 One of the first propaganda efforts was the selection of “token Jews” to the 
German Olympic team to satisfy the IOC and the countries threatening boycott. The 
Nazis selected three Jewish athletes in an attempt to show the IOC the Nazis were 
addressing concerns of the international community and adhering to Olympic ideals. Rudi 
Ball, Helene Mayer, and Gretel Bergmann were the three Jewish athletes allowed on the 
Olympic team. Ball, a half-Jewish hockey player, competed in the Winter Games at 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. In the case of Ball, the Nazis begrudgingly allowed him to 
participate because without him the German hockey team’s chance of medaling seriously 
declined.164 Helene Mayer was a half-Jewish fencer who won a gold medal as a member 
of the German team in the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam.165 Mayer’s mother was 
“Aryan” which meant she technically could still be considered a German citizen 
according to the Nuremberg Laws. The sports club she belonged to nonetheless expelled 
her for her Jewish ancestry.166 The fencer physically looked like a model “Aryan” with 
her fair skin and blonde hair.167 Mayer’s presence on the Olympic team was palatable 
enough to the Nazis to allow her to compete in the summer of 1936. The same was not 
true for Gretel Bergmann, a fully Jewish track runner living in exile in England. The 
Nazis selected Bergmann, the only fully Jewish athlete on the German Olympic Team, to 
respond to the external pressures from the IOC and appease boycotters in the United 
States, France, and Britain.168 Bergmann’s opportunity to compete in the Olympics 
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however turned out to be nothing but a propaganda move to ensure participation from 
nations threatening to boycott. Even Bergmann’s time spent on the Olympic team was 
marked with discrimination, breaking the promises of Lewald and Tschammer that 
Jewish athletes would receive equal opportunities. The Nazis even took away 
Bergmann’s choice to participate. Bergmann had been “invited” to try out for the German 
Olympic Team in 1935 under threat of harm to her family in Germany if she chose not to 
participate.169 The insincerity and propaganda driven inclusion of Jews in the Olympic 
Games was made apparent by Bergmann’s performance at the Games. In the summer of 
1936 Bergmann never made it on to the playing field. Bergmann was denied participation 
in German Olympic qualifying meets thus preventing her from making the Olympic 
team.170 However, Bergmann did not know she had not qualified until the American 
Olympic Team began its journey to Berlin and Karl Ritter von Halt informed Bergmann. 
Halt cited “inadequate qualifying performance” as the reason for her inability to compete 
despite her first place finishes in practice trials.171 The Nazis used “token Jews” as 
propaganda tools to convince the international community that they had upheld their 
promises and to hide the reality of Jewish discrimination on the German Olympic Team. 
 The truly masterful propaganda feat executed by Hitler and the Nazis was the 
successful hiding of the commonplace anti-Semitic sentiments and visible signs of 
discrimination from international visitors in Berlin. The Nazis’ test run for their 
propaganda efforts were the Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The Winter 
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Games commenced February 6, 1936 only about two months after the AAU settled the 
American participation question in an extremely close vote. Although the invitations had 
already been accepted to the Summer Games the success of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen 
Games was an opportunity for the Nazis to show the international community German 
Jews were not being persecuted, showcase the competency of the Nazi Regime, and 
create international confidence about the execution of the Summer Games. As one 
Bavarian official put it, “The whole world will assess the prospects for a successful 
Olympic year according to our preparations for the winter event.”172 Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, a small town at the base of the Zugspitze mountain in Bavaria, did not 
escape the reach of the Nazis and was considered to be an especially anti-Semitic 
location. The town’s elected officials were enthusiastic members of the NSDAP and right 
before the Games the town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen passed a Jewish expulsion bill.173 
Aside from the Nazi party town officials the anti-Semitic publication Der Stürmer sat 
readily available in vending cases on public street corners and signs forbidding Jews from 
public spaces were displayed prominently throughout the town.174  For example, one 
poster that hung in front of a Garmisch-Partenkirchen ski club read, “Admission of Jews 
is Forbidden.”175 To prepare for the international visitors all signs like the one above 
were removed from buildings, businesses, and the newly built road from Munich to the 
mountain town.176 Along with the signs the copies of Der Stürmer were removed from 
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the street and citizens and business owners were instructed to be cordial with all foreign 
guests, including Jewish foreigners. However, it should be noted that Hitler did not throw 
the weight of his authority into suppressing anti-Semitic feeling in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen until the IOC president, Baillet-Latour pressured him to conform with 
Olympic principles.177 Eventually, in order to appease tensions abroad Hitler stripped the 
town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen of any physical signs of anti-Semitism. 
 During the period of competition at Garmisch-Partenkirchen Goebbels and the 
Ministry of Propaganda controlled the German press. Not wanting any news getting out 
to the foreign press that would taint the perception of the Games, members of the German 
press were instructed to write of nothing but the athletic competitions.178 Goebbels and 
the Ministry of Propaganda further regulated the media by approving which images taken 
by German photographers could be distributed to the international press.179 To ensure the 
foreign press gathered no stories of Nazi anti-Semitism, all Nazi officials were on their 
best behavior. The good behavior originated from the top of the Third Reich. In the 
opening ceremony of the Winter Games, Hitler showed surprising self-restraint and 
limited his opening speech to the single customary line, “I hereby declare these Fourth 
Winter Games, held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, open.”180 Hitler, other high ranking 
Nazis, and SS troops stationed around Garmisch-Partenkirchen avoided any overtly 
political or inflammatory actions so the foreign press, especially the Americans, did not 
have anything to write home about. For the most part, most international members of the 
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press reported nothing but wonderful feelings about what the Nazis put together in 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Frank Birchall, a reporter for the New York Times wrote, “There 
is probably no tourist here who will not go home averring that unmilitaristic, hospitable 
and tolerant country in Europe and that all the foreign correspondents stationed here are 
liars.”181 The VIP treatment shown to the foreign press, complete with wining and dining, 
must have also helped give international reporters a positive experience.182 Not all 
reporters were quite as taken with Nazi Germany as Birchall. Specifically the Austrian 
press held a much more critical view of the Games with one reporter asserting, “In many 
respects the organization here has failed entirely.”183 Although there were critical 
accounts of the Fourth Winter Olympiad from the likes of the American journalist and 
Nazi critic Will Shirer, the overall feeling after the Garmisch-Partenkirchen Games was 
one of success. Despite the warnings that the Nazis simply covered up their abuses 
temporarily from Shirer and others, headlines praising the Garmisch-Partenkirchen 
Games like, “Olympics a Gay Show; The Tall Bavarian Mountains are an Ideal Setting 
for the Winter Games,” pervaded the international press.184 Going into the Summer 
Olympics in Berlin the Third Reich felt confident about their propaganda efforts in 
February, the international acceptance of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and the Nazi regime. 
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Hitler displayed just how assured he felt by the international community when he 
blatantly breached the Treaty of Versailles and remilitarized the Rhineland in March of 
1936.  
 When the time came for the 1936 Berlin Olympics the Nazis were experienced in 
hiding Jewish persecution from international visitors. Very similar to the Fourth Winter 
Olympiad in Garmisch-Partenkirchen all visible indicators of discrimination were 
removed from public spaces where an international audience could potentially see. Once 
again Hitler ordered all the anti-Semitic signs on the streets to be taken down.185 He 
ordered the German press to cease printing any anti-Semitic content for the duration of 
the Games. Der Stürmer once again was removed from newsstands and the Nazi regime 
gave the German press a directive ordering “The racial point of view should not be used 
in any way in reporting sports results; above all Negroes should not be insensitively 
reported.”186 
 When the Third Reich was not trying to downplay or erase anti-Semitism it was 
trying to promote the vitality and success of the Nazis and the “Aryan race”. The 1936 
Berlin Olympics exalted the Nazi regime. From start to finish the Olympic Games 
explicitly tried to link the “Aryan” Germans to the ancient Greeks in physique, culture, 
and success. The Olympic torch relay was one tool used to not so subtly equate the glory 
of the ancient Greeks to the “Aryan” race. Created by Carl Diem, the Olympic Torch 
                                                        
185 Ellen Brandt, interview with the USC Shoah Foundation, USC Shoah Foundation 
Institute, online video, https://sfi.usc.edu/playlist/1936-berlin-olympics. 
186 Susan D. Bachrach, Edward J. Phillips, Steven Luckert, and the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, State of Deception: The Power of Nazi Propaganda (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 84. 
 67 
relay began on the site of the ancient festival in Olympia, Greece and ended in the Reich 
Sport Field in Berlin. Symbolically the relay represented the passing of the torch of high 
civilization from the ancient Greeks to “Aryan” Germans. The event provided another 
way for the Nazis to display their superiority through propaganda. 
The Opening Ceremonies of the 1936 Olympics, previously an international 
celebration of the collection of nations, turned into a ritualistic display honoring Hitler 
and the Nazi party. As one newspaper headline noted the, “Fuehrer Key Man in Olympic 
Show.”187 Before Hitler’s arrival into the stadium broadcasters updated the masses 
gathered for miles outside the stadium with news like, “We await the Fuehrer every 
moment. Never would this great field have been erected except for the Fuehrer. It was 
created by his will.”188 Hitler continued receiving godlike treatment throughout the rest of 
the ceremony from the excited spectators. As Hitler entered the stadium the chorus of 
“heils” drowned out the sound of the broadcasters.189 When the “new Caesar of this era” 
entered the stadium spectators leapt to their feet “with their arms outstretched and voices 
raised in frantic greeting.”190 Finally, when the time came for the customary Parade of 
Nations, once again the focus was diverted from the Olympic teams to the Führer. As the 
Olympic teams marched through the stadium carrying the flags of their respective nations 
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confusion ensued as athletes gave the “Olympic salute,” which looked very similar to the 
Hitler-Gruss. Despite the intention of the athletes, some of which may actually have been 
saluting Hitler, the mostly German crowd interpreted the gestures as an homage to Hitler 
and Germany.191 In response to each saluting nation the crowd roared and cheered in 
approval of the international salutatory recognition.192 In the official report of the Berlin 
Olympic Games images reveal the crowds enthusiastic reaction in response to the Parade 
of Nations. One image captures a sea of people in the stadium raising their right hands 
out in front of their bodies in an enthusiastic salute with the caption, “The flag of every 
nation was greeted in this manner.”193 As a result of the crowd’s enthusiasm and the 
purposeful programming of the event, the Opening Ceremony transformed into a 
nationalistic fanfare in celebration of the Third Reich supported by the enthusiasm of 
most of the visiting nations. 
Aside from the bombastic and nationalistic reactions of the crowd of over 100,000 
people gathered in the Reich Sport Field, the German Organizing Committee, controlled 
by the Nazi party, meticulously planned the programming of the ceremony to control the 
narrative surrounding the Third Reich.194 For example, the first ever torch lighting at the 
end of the torch relay was perfectly timed to coincide with the end of the performance of 
the Olympic Hymn. Just as the original composition by one of Germany’s greatest living 
composers, Richard Strauss, produced its final notes, Fritz Schilgen entered the 
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stadium.195 Schilgen, a tall, lanky, blond-hair, and blue-eyed runner ran across the 
stadium, climbed the stage, and set ablaze the tripod built to hold the Olympic flame the 
next sixteen days.196 The tripod, fashioned after the common ancient Greek piece of 
furniture often used for sacrificial purposes, hearkened back the ancient origins of the 
revived Games.197 Schilgen’s final run was a physical representation of the “Aryan” race 
as the torchbearers of civilization in the modern world, much like the Greeks in the 
ancient world. Another example of purposeful propaganda messages in the opening 
ceremonies was the GOC’s decision to assign the task of organizing the Parade of 
Nations to a Wehrmacht major practiced in choreographing military reviews in Berlin.198 
The selection of an experienced military organizer ensured the ceremony was executed 
impeccably to further the perception of national socialism as a superior form of 
government able to compete with Western democracy and mobilize the masses. This 
narrative would later be played out during Olympic competition. The opening ceremonies 
were even used to soften Hitler’s image. Upon entering the stadium, a small blond child 
approached the Führer and presented him with a bouquet of flowers, which he eagerly 
accepted.199 Even the seemingly spontaneous and precious moment was orchestrated by 
the organizers. The five year old child was none other than the daughter of the GOC 
general secretary Carl Diem.200 For the Nazis, every second of the opening ceremonies 
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presented an opportunity to show the world a purposefully edited version of the Third 
Reich.  
Olympic competition itself became a battlefield of ideologies. The participation of 
non- “Aryans” in the Olympic Games presented an opportunity for the international 
community to challenge the Nazi assertion of “Aryan” superiority. The most popular 
figure often used to point to the defeat of Nazi ideology in the Olympic Games is Jesse 
Owens. The African-American track runner won four gold medals at the 1936 Berlin 
Games.201 Along with Owens, seventeen other African Americans competed in 1936 with 
many medaling in their events.202 The other demographic that challenged Hitler’s master 
race ideology was Jewish athletes. Nine Jewish athletes in total received Olympic medals 
in 1936, including Helene Mayer, the only German-Jew to compete on the German 
Olympic team in the Summer Games.203 While the non-“Aryan” competitors performed 
well in the 1936 Summer Games and presented a challenge to Nazi racial ideology, many 
have gone too far by saying the success of Jesse Owens and other minority athletes 
completely invalidated the Nazis’ racial claims. In the end, despite the strong 
performances from minorities, Germany walked away from Berlin with the highest total 
medal count and gold medal count.204  The success of the German Olympic team in 
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athletic competition, despite the success of minorities, acted as another form of 
propaganda asserting “Aryan” superiority. 
Finally, perhaps the piece of propaganda from the 1936 Olympic Games that truly 
stood the test of time was the state sponsored film, Olympia, created by the famed 
director, Leni Riefenstahl. The two part, almost four-hour long documentary captured all 
the exciting moments of the Berlin Games, but also perpetuated the same tropes 
promoted by the Nazis throughout the Games. The opening scene lasted approximately 
fifteen minutes long and exalted the cultural and athletic accomplishments of the ancient 
Greeks. The sweeping panoramic shots moving through the ruins of Olympia and the 
insertion of famous Greek sculptures throughout gave an air of admiration and nostalgia 
for the glory of the ancient Greek civilization. The scene continued with the 
transformation of the famous Discobolus statue from marble into a live male athlete 
which highlighted the beauty of the superior physicality of the ancient Greek 
Olympians.205 Riefenstahl then transitioned from the celebration of the human form to the 
lighting of the Olympic torch in the ruins of Olympia. From Olympia, Riefenstahl 
followed the Olympic torch relay on its journey through Europe, all the way into the 
Reich Sport Field where the Olympic Flame was ignited. The whole elaborate display 
emphasized what was already noted about the torch relay. Riefenstahl during the opening 
scene created a direct comparison between the ancient Greeks and Nazi Germany as the 
culturally, physically, and politically superior civilization of their respective times. The 
rest of the documentary showed footage from the opening ceremonies, the athletic 
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competition, and the closing ceremonies. While the rest of the content of Olympia was 
not nearly as symbolic as the opening scene, the film showed a well-executed, successful, 
and joyful Olympic Games put on by the Nazis. The film Olympia, paid for by the Nazis, 
was created as a way of immortalizing the glory and success of Nazi Germany in the 
1936 Berlin Olympics for years to come. 
All the effort the Nazis exerted towards presenting Germany under the Third 
Reich as a thriving, successful, and peaceful state ultimately succeeded.  The prevailing 
attitude of foreign visitors leaving Berlin was overwhelmingly positive. Members of the 
IOC walked away from Berlin praising Hitler’s Germany as great agent of Olympism, 
and Avery Brundage even hailed the Berlin Games as the “best ever.”206 Average 
spectators also returned back to their home countries with similar sentiments. In some 
cases, international visitors seemed quite smitten with the act the German state presented 
to them in Berlin. One journalist working for the Los Angeles Times enthusiastically 
reported, “From the sun-bronzed blond frauleins of the suburbs to the highest government 
officials including Der Fuehrer Adolph Hitler himself, all the ladies and gentlemen of the 
German capital have put a new meaning into the word hospitality and set up a new 
Olympic record for official and unofficial parties.”207 Hitler and the Nazis’ achieved their 
lofty goals for the Summer Olympiad. Not only were visitors impressed with the “social 
achievement of the German nation” in the three short years since the Nazis came to 
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power, but many left Berlin believing the truth about the Nazis could not be as bad as the 
rumors asserted.208 The success of the Nazi propaganda efforts uncovered the potential 
power within the Olympic Games themselves to be a tool for propaganda.  
Similar to the 1936 Berlin Games, the Olympiads following frequently used the 
Olympic Games very intentionally to convey a specific narrative. The Games continually 
were used to make a statement to the international community, or a nation’s own people, 
but the most elaborate of the propaganda campaigns in the wake of 1936 were the 2008 
Beijing Games. The heavily involved Chinese government used hosting the Olympics as 
an opportunity to show the Western world the validity of their ideology and way of life. 
Similar to the Germans in 1936, the Chinese government spared no expense for the 
execution of the largest international festival to ever be held on Chinese soil.209 The $40 
billion bill reveals just how invested the Chinese government was in the success of the 
Olympic Games. One consistent criticism Beijing continually faced during the bid 
process was the issue of air-pollution. In a response to the international community’s 
worries, the Chinese government spent approximately $20.5 billion to clear out the air 
pollution in the city.210 The massive reallocation of resources to deal with the long 
standing pollution problem right before the Olympic Games was all a part of the Chinese 
government’s efforts to sell a narrative of China as a developed nation on par with 
Western metropolises, clean-air and all. Finally, in an ultimate exertion of government 
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control of the Games, in an attempt to make the Beijing Games as pleasant as possible, 
the Chinese government used the weather as a tool of propaganda. To avoid the forecast 
of rain at the Opening Ceremonies, the Chinese government used its Weather 
Modification Program to disperse rain clouds before they had a chance to quite literally, 
rain on China’s parade.211 China’s meticulous attention to every detail, down to every last 
rain drop, was meant to show the world the glory of the great nation of China, one of the 
world’s leading economic powers, but also a nation of great culture and national pride. 
The great fanfare and extravagance of the whole Olympic Games in Beijing exalted 
Chinese nationalism and the narrative of China as a harmonious “green” nation distracted 
from human rights violations. The Summer Olympics in Beijing served a similar purpose 
as the 1936 Olympics. The Games provided the Chinese government an opportunity to 
“come out” to the world and sculpt the narrative surrounding China through the 
Olympics, much like the new Nazi regime accomplished in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. 
With the heightened sense of nationalism established in 1936 followed by the 
Cold War era, governments became more invested in the performance of national 
Olympic teams. Through various methods of controlling Olympic outcomes and 
perpetuating selected messages through the propaganda potential of the Games, national 
governments developed a new arena though which to exert national dominance. 
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Chapter 3: Technology and Media 
The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the first truly modern Olympics because the 
organizers made use of the emerging technological advancements and media of the day 
as no one had before, completely changing the precedent for how successful Olympics 
operated. In preparation for the 1936 Games the German Olympic Committee (GOC) 
members focused on engineering new technologies to facilitate the events. The Nazis also 
contributed to technological innovations through the backing of Leni Riefenstahl’s film, 
Olympia, which pioneered advancements in sports photography that subsequently shaped 
how sporting events were captured on film and in photographs. In conjunction with new 
technologies created for the Games, the Nazis used existing technologies to launch an 
Olympic media and advertising effort of unparalleled scale, which has since grown. The 
attitude of the Nazi regime towards the Olympic Games, and the position of the Games in 
an age of unprecedented technological growth placed the German state in a particularly 
favorable position to use the momentum of the time and place to accelerate the Olympics 
toward a new, modern, technological standard.  
To understand the Nazis’ advancement of the Olympic Games into the modern era 
one must understand the context within which the Berlin Olympics fell. The late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century technological innovations changed the way the 
world functioned. Coming off the Second Industrial Revolution and World War I, 
Europeans had changed at a rate more rapid than any other previous time period.  In the 
fifty or so years leading up to the Games at Berlin new technologies irrevocably altered 
human perceptions of time and space and how humans interact with others. For example, 
with the invention of the telephone human perception of time and space shrunk, as 
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physical distance and time were no longer barriers to communication. However, in 1936 
the new possibilities resulting from the technological advancement had not yet been fully 
realized outside the context of war. The advent of World War I in Europe pushed 
technology further than ever before as national leaders invested resources into research 
and development so as not to be put at a disadvantage on the battlefield. The 1936 
Olympic Games combined the technological innovations of the previous fifty years and 
an international event to create the first instance of a mass global spectacle. The Nazis 
with their expert organization and propensity for propaganda were given an opportunity 
at a very favorable moment in time. Their advantageous position allowed them to bring 
together the technological advancement of the age and their propaganda machine to 
create the first truly modern event of the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
 
Technology 
The technological equipment the Germans utilized and created specifically for the 
1936 Games marked the beginning of the modern reliance on technology to facilitate the 
Olympics. In preparation for the Games the GOC, under the supervision of the Nazi 
government, endeavored to update previous technology to accommodate an event the size 
of the Olympics.212 The organizers first tackled improving upon technological equipment 
already in existence in order to enhance the experience of the over 100,000 spectators the 
newly constructed Olympic Stadium could accommodate.213 Specifically, with such a 
large venue, the need arose to develop loud speakers that “would not produce interior 
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echoes” in the stadium.214 The solution originated in the research and development 
departments of the German electrical industry, which revamped the loudspeakers created 
for the Nuremberg rallies to service an even larger crowd.215  The German state also 
spearheaded innovations with the purpose of improving the facilitation of the athletic 
competitions. In previous Olympics the scoring and timekeeping relied solely on human 
objectivity and competency. In order to decrease the possibility of errors in the often 
contentious and highly emotional Olympic events, the government entity, Physikalisch 
Technische Bundesanstalt, developed multiple new technological devices for use in the 
1936 Games. One such innovation was a camera sophisticated enough to reliably capture 
what would now be aptly named “photo finishes” in track and swimming events.216 
Another was a very early computerized scoreboard used in diving events that displayed 
the final marks of the judges.217  Finally, the GOC commissioned the creation of an 
electric hit registering apparatus for fencing. The new pressure sensitive electrical system 
more accurately recorded the hits a human judge may have missed during the fast paced 
series of lunges and parries characteristic of fencing.218 The equipment produced for the 
1936 Games reflected the type of technology the Olympic Games have depended on 
since 1936.   
One aspect of the Nazis’ 1936 Olympics that distinguishes the Berlin Games as a 
distinctly modern spectacle was the use of radio broadcasting. By 1936 the Nazi regime 
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was well acquainted with the medium of radio. Hitler and Joseph Goebbels in the 
Ministry of Propaganda quickly realized the power of radio broadcasting, and from the 
very start of the Nazi regime in 1933 the government used the effective tool to 
disseminate party propaganda. For example, Goebbels commissioned and distributed the 
Volksempfänger (people’s receiver), an inexpensive radio set; so all German people could 
afford to access governmental broadcasts.219 While some may argue the 1932 Olympics 
in Los Angeles was a modern sized event that preceded the Berlin Games, the argument 
is difficult to support as the Los Angeles Games ignored broadcasting technologies like 
radio.220 The organizers of the Berlin Olympics were the first to use radio expertly to 
promote the competition in the years before the Olympic Games as well as to keep the 
world enthralled in each moment of the Games as they progressed. Before the games 
even started radio broadcasts aired throughout the world. The German Broadcasting 
Company created a radio program entitled Olympia, designed to educate the listener 
about the history of the modern Olympic Games, different types of Olympic sports, and 
provide helpful tips for those interested in visiting Berlin.221 The media coverage during 
the Games was even more extensive than the broadcasting leading up to the two weeks of 
competition. Not only was live radio broadcasting a new form of media at the Olympics, 
but the scale of the operation reached an unparalleled number of people throughout the 
world. Over the duration of the Games, over 3,000 transmissions were made during the 
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Games to forty different countries.222 The estimated number of listeners reached over 300 
million people.223 The number of people around the world engaged in the real time 
updates of the Games in 1936 was on a scale now commonplace to Games in the latter 
half of the century. Rather than only those fortunate enough to travel to the Olympic 
venues being able to follow the Olympics in real time, after 1936 millions of people 
accessed real time updates. While the Berlin Olympics were no 2016 Rio Olympics 
which boasted reports of half of the world’s population tuning into Olympic coverage, the 
radio technology implemented by GOC with the help of the German Broadcasting 
Company, was the first significant step towards the type of visibility achieved by the Rio 
Games.224 
The logistical challenge of creating the infrastructure to accommodate the volume 
of radio broadcasting during the Games presented another technological hurdle the Nazis 
had to overcome. The Nazis were well acquainted with domestic radio broadcasting, but 
the Olympics forced the Nazis to figure out how to organize and technologically support 
the large number of international broadcasters they expected to host at the Olympics. 
Preparations to equip the Olympic facilities began months in advance of the Summer 
Games. The GOC only chose the best radio broadcasters in Germany due to the 
complications incurred by the packed programming of the Games. In order to 
successfully broadcast all the events, a lot of which occurred simultaneously, the 
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announcers underwent several months of training “in transmitting national and 
international sporting events.”225 During the Games at any given time during the radio 
broadcasts around 15 to 20 announcers of the German Radio sat poised at their 
microphones waiting for their cue to begin.226 In order to accommodate the large numbers 
of foreign broadcasters flocking to Berlin, 68 transmission facilities were built at various 
locations around the city.227 The central convergence point of the 68 remote stations, 
nicknamed the “40-Countries Exchange, was built in the Olympic Stadium under the 
“Führer’s loge [sic.].”228 From the inside of the 40-Countries Exchange hundreds of 
employees worked constantly sending transmissions received from the remote stations to 
forty-one different broadcasting companies, which served forty different countries in 50 
different languages.229  To accommodate the large number of transmissions the German 
Broadcasting Company developed a switch board twenty-one meters long with 10,000 
contacts, designed to receive every transmission from the 1936 Games.230  The massive 
logistics operation needed to reach the 300 million listeners emphasizes the sophistication 
of the operation and illustrates that the radio technology used and improved by the Nazis 
turned the Games into a truly modern global spectacle. 
Finally, one of the most significant, but least successful technological advances of 
the Berlin Games was live television broadcasting. The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the 
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first live televised sporting events.231 Yet the broadcasts in 1936 were minimal as 
personal television sets were not available to the average consumer around the world. 
Still, the events were broadcast to twenty-five different locations around the city of Berlin 
including the Olympic Village where the athletes could watch the events through their 
remote television set.232 Even though the Nazis were at the forefront of television 
technology their equipment was still very primitive and the quality of the broadcasts left 
much to be desired. In order to broadcast live events fifteen kilometers of television 
cables had to be installed in the Reich Sport Field and only four sites were equipped with 
the television cameras used to broadcast.233 Although the Nazis did not create a very 
sophisticated television broadcast operation they were successful in exposing the 
potential of the new platform. Despite the poor optics, the television rooms throughout 
the city were packed with viewers anxious to watch the broadcasts. Obtaining a seat in 
the television rooms was almost as competitive as securing a seat in the Olympic 
stadium.234  The Reichspost, which oversaw the initiative, estimated after the end of the 
Games that approximately 162,228 people had watched the Olympic telecasts.235 After 
1936 television became an inseparable part of the Olympic Games. In the very next 
Olympiad, in London 1948, the British earned the distinction of broadcasting to the first 
home television.236 Since 1948 television became one of the leading ways people around 
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the world consume the Olympic Games. Despite the limitations of the 1936 Berlin 
Games’ television broadcasts, the Nazis and the GOC demonstrated the possibilities of 
the new platform and introduced the revolutionary technology to the Olympic Games and 
the modern era. 
 
Sports Photography and Video 
Sports photography and the dynamic recording of sports in film, today an integral 
part of all sporting events, was a unique development in 1936 propelled forward by Nazi 
propensity for spectacle and the innovations of Leni Riefenstahl in her documentary 
Olympia (1938). The work done by Riefenstahl produced new methods for capturing 
sports in photographs and motion pictures that provided the foundation for modern sports 
photography. Historian Richard Mandell characterizes the advancements pioneered by 
Riefenstahl when he writes, “To say that sports cinematography was in its infancy before 
1936 is metaphorically as well as factually inaccurate, since self-conscious sports 
cinematography was introduced to the world by Leni Riefenstahl.”237 Previous 
undertakings to film sport had been well received and piqued an interest in using motion 
picture cameras to capture athletic contests. The first instance of sports recorded on film 
came from the 1908 London Games where a newsreel company captured the dramatic 
finish of the marathon runner Dorando Pietri.238 In the short film of the controversial 
finish, the exhausted Pietri crosses the finish line while being physically supported by 
Olympic officials before he completely collapses. The footage reproduced the drama and 
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excitement of athletic competition and showed that sports and cinematography could 
produce a good pairing. Prior to Riefenstahl, the Americans in 1932 made an attempt to 
produce a film about the Los Angeles Games, but the project never materialized.239 
Despite previous attempts, Riefenstahl was at the forefront of the budding film industry. 
Only about seven years prior to the making of Olympia did “talking pictures,” or films 
with sound, come into existence.240 While Mandell discredits all work before 
Riefenstahl’s, Mandell certainly is correct in the spirit of his words, as Leni Riefenstahl’s 
documentary was a defining work of sports cinematography that pioneered new methods 
to capture the fast paced nature of sports like never before, updated variations of which 
are still used today.  
Riefenstahl’s innovative techniques, quality of image, volume of footage, and 
meticulous editing put her work in a completely different category and class than any 
previous sports cinematography endeavor. After her documentary about the 1934 
Nuremberg rally, titled Triumph of Will, the Nazi government, Riefenstahl received a lot 
of attention from the Nazis, especially the Führer himself. Deeply impressed by her work, 
Hitler asked her to direct another documentary chronicling the 1936 Olympics. The 
idealized purpose of the documentary, as Riefenstahl recounts in her memoirs, was for 
the film to communicate the great ancient ideals of the Olympic Games.241 On December 
1, 1935, Leni Riefenstahl signed a contract with the Ministry of Propaganda committing 
herself to the ambitious task of creating a documentary of the Eleventh Olympic 
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Games.242 In her contract Riefenstahl acquired what no other press photographer or 
reporter had ever possessed. On top of very generous government financing of her 
project, she was given close to unlimited access to all of the Olympic venues.243 The “up 
close and personal” access allowed Riefenstahl to capture athletic competition in more 
detail than anyone previously, but it also presented unique challenges to the young 
director. Riefenstahl devised new methods to shoot the fast-paced sports competition with 
early film equipment that was usually anything but portable. Once given the contract, 
Riefenstahl set to work building a skilled crew of eighty cameramen and assistants and 
started strategizing the logistics to tackle the enormous undertaking.244 In the year leading 
up the Olympics Riefenstahl and her crew tested and devised new equipment, and trained 
for months to successfully shoot with it. Just to learn how to capture the diving sequences 
alone her crew had to train for six months with specialty lenses.245  
Although some of her innovations were not allowed on the day of the actual 
Games out of concern for the well-being of the athletes, the final product was 
groundbreaking in sports photography. One example of such innovations were the camera 
dugouts Reifenstahl shoveled out next to the jumping pits and the sprinting tracks. The 
gutters were used to procure low angle action shots of the track and field athletes. 
However, after Jesse Owens almost fell into one of the pits, most of them had to be 
filled.246 Other innovations created for Olympia were more successful, like the camera 
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one of Riefenstahl’s crew created to capture underwater shots in swimming and dive 
events.247 Riefenstahl also expertly devised new methods for shooting track events that 
eliminated a cameraman and allowed the camera to move alongside the athletes. Also for 
the track and field events, she created a rail system that made it possible for a camera 
without an operator to move alongside a sprinter and capture the race to the finish.248 
Similarly, at the rowing events, she ordered a one hundred meter platform constructed 
adjacent to the rowing course near the finish line on which she placed a car that towed an 
automatic camera to capture the final exciting legs of the races.249 The various 
apparatuses, angle, and lenses created by Leni Riefenstahl guided the development of 
sports photography at the Olympics, and in all of sport. 
The access granted to Riefenstahl and her crew at the 1936 Olympics put the 
sports photographer closer than ever before. Instead of providing a snap shot of the 
audience’s view, Riefenstahl and her resulting Olympia produced a perspective that no 
spectator could have obtained while at the Games. The advancement of sports 
photography from a spectator snapshot to images and videos that provides an otherwise 
unattainable vantage point is a defining quality of modern sports photography. Mandell 
eloquently describes the difference between the modern sports photography Riefenstahl 
helped pioneer and the era before, when he describes previous attempts at sports 
cinematography, “One saw athletic events as though he were an astigmatic, myopic, 
palsied spectator in the stands.”250 The new artistic and stylized portrayal of sport and 
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athletics created by Riefenstahl fit beautifully in the Nazi’s world of the aestheticization 
of politics and all other aspects of “Aryan” German life.    
 
Media and Advertising: 
Prior to the 1936 Olympic Games media and advertising played a trivial part in 
the planning and execution of the international spectacle. In most of the previous 
Olympics the main venue used to advertise the Games and cover them as they unfolded 
were newspapers and magazine spots. Preceding Games had been successful in attracting 
hundreds and eventually thousands of journalists, including a large number of 
international reporters accredited all over the world. As early as the 1912 Stockholm 
Olympics 445 reporters were present at the Games and over fifty percent of them hailed 
from outside of Sweden.251 The numbers of journalists present at the international Games 
only grew and by 1928, Amsterdam hosted around one thousand journalists, including 
many from non-European nations. At the 1932 Games in Los Angeles the Americans 
ramped up the media effort surrounding the Olympics surpassing any of the previous 
Games. Organizers of the Los Angeles Games succeeded in drawing the largest crowd in 
the short Olympic history. The first matter the organizers saw to was the creation of a 
press department solely for the purpose of promoting the 1932 Games, which assembled 
a list of approximately 6,000 foreign periodicals with which the Committee sent out bi- 
weekly bulletins of the Organizers’ progress.252 In addition to frequent bulletin’s the 
Organizing created an official publication titled, “Olympic,” some editions of which were 
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published in four languages.253 Aside from various publications the Organizing 
Committee produced, Los Angeles also made efforts to entice journalists to make the trek 
to Southern California. During the years of preparation for the 1932 Games, several 
hundred journalists visited the LA Press Department.254 Los Angeles was also the first 
Olympic event to really embrace communication technology by outfitting Olympic 
facilities with telephones and telegraphs for reporters’ use, thus making international 
coverage of the Games an easier task for traveling newspaper reporters.255 Finally, the 
creation of an organized ticket selling operation provided more people than ever the 
opportunity to take part in the Olympic Games. The Los Angeles Organizers lowered the 
price of tickets and created a sales office equipped with phone in order to make the 
Olympics accessible to a broader range of people. The strategies of the Los Angeles 
Organizers successfully created excitement for the Olympiad and enticed more people 
than ever to the Games.   
While the 1932 Games had impressive media coverage and advertising efforts on 
a larger scale than any Olympics before, the Germans made Los Angeles Organizers’ 
efforts look minimal in comparison. At the Berlin Games the German’s use of media and 
advertising far exceeded any previous undertakings in scale and international reach. 
Fueled by the need to bring a large number of people to the 1936 Games to offset the 
incredible cost of hosting and show the superior prowess of German people to the rest of 
the world, the Germans mobilized an unprecedented media effort. The first step in the 
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publicity effort was to establish the Publicity Commission. Josef Goebbels and the Reich 
Ministry of Propaganda took it upon itself to appoint the members of the newly formed 
commission. In conjunction with the German Railway Publicity Bureau, the Publicity 
Commission set up forty-four individual foreign offices in forty different countries.256 
Once the public relations infrastructure was set up around the world, the real foreign 
publicity effort began. 
In the years leading up to the Games Carl Diem and the Ministry of Propaganda 
were hard at work trying to get both international and domestic audiences to Berlin. The 
international effort succeeded in reaching more people than ever before. The scope of 
advertising ploys covered everything from plastering posters throughout the Buenos 
Aires metro system to deploying an airplane bearing Berlin Olympics decorations to do 
stunts above the city of Chicago.257 The German Railway Publicity Bureau sent out over 
four million pamphlets to dozens of countries.258 The German Railway Bureau also 
agreed to give all foreigners traveling to Berlin for the Olympics a 60% discount to 
incentivize international patronage of the Games.259 However, the amount of written 
information churned out and distributed by the German public relations effort was 
incredible. As early as 1933 Carl Diem created an Olympics News Service.260 Diem’s 
publication was a monthly newspaper sent to all Olympics-connected offices in the world 
and the international press detailing the progress of the impending 1936 Games. At its 
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height the Olympic News Service published 25,000 copies per issue and printed it in 
fourteen different languages.261 The Publicity Commission also created a monthly 
magazine titled, “Olympic Games 1936.”262 The magazine’s first publication was thirty-
two pages long, printed in four different languages and 60,000 copies were produced.263 
At its height, the magazine was 86 pages long and 75,000 copies of the issue were 
produced.264 The magazine even secured international advertisements from the likes of 
the American multinational company Coca-Cola to place in its magazines.265 Besides the 
periodicals the scale of simple advertisements such as posters, stamps, and pamphlets 
reflected the scope of the mass marketing of the era it ushered in. Two hundred thousand 
posters were sent to thirty-five countries.266 Thirty-five thousand pamphlets detailing 
information about Berlin were sent out for free, along with thousands of postcards in 
multiple languages.267 The full reach of the media efforts remains unknown as often the 
promotional material such as posters, pamphlets, postcards, and photographs were 
reprinted and distributed upon reaching their destination. Truly, the Nazi media effort 
covered the globe with news of its Olympic endeavor. Ultimately the media efforts 
successfully drew people to Berlin, especially foreign press. The Organizing Committee 
enticed approximately 3,000 reporters to travel to the 1936 Games, “more than the three 
previous Games combined.268 The German Olympic Committee and the Reich Ministry 
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of Propaganda succeeded in mobilizing and informing people through the use of media, 
and the Berlin Olympics produced a new model for future spectacles. The Nazi media 
provided an example of how to effectively harness the power of the platforms available in 
the still young twentieth century. 
The Olympics of twenty first century are often defined by the use of innovative 
technology, including sport photography and filming, and media. Although the current 
Olympic Games increased the scale and sophistication of technology and media from the 
1936 Olympics. Berlin was the first instance of the effective incorporation the 
aforementioned staples of the modern Olympic Games into the international festival. The 
presence of technology and media on a mass scale for the first time in Berlin allows one 
to classify 1936 as the first truly modern Olympic Games.   
 
The Advantageous Position of the Nazis 
The timing and nature of the Nazi political machine situated the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics in a perfect position to take advantage of the technology and media 
opportunities previously unutilized in the organization of Olympic Games. The 
coalescence of these various forces resulted in a fundamental change in the way the 
Olympics and large spectacles were organized. The Nazi system allowed the 1936 
Olympics to thrive and grow because the Nazis already possessed experience in the areas 
of propaganda and spectacle. Although from the very inception of the modern Olympic 
Games the ideal behind the Olympics inherently contradicted the reality of the Games. 
The Nazis magnified this contradiction more than anyone before them. The supposed 
ideal of Baron Pierre de Coubertin when he created the modern Olympics was to 
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celebrate the athletic ability of individuals and decrease international tensions.269 In 
reality, from the very first Olympics, the event was used as a nationalistic measuring stick 
by which nations could compare their success and vitality to others. While previous 
Olympics garnered support from the leaders of the host nation to execute the Games, no 
other national government before the Nazis had been so intimately involved in every 
aspect of Olympic planning. The unprecedented level of involvement, and specifically 
monetary investment from the government, pushed the Berlin Games forward to establish 
a new precedent for Olympic Games in technology and media.  
 Prior to 1936 the Nazis already built a solid foundation to logistically 
accommodate large spectacles like the Olympic Games. The Nuremberg rallies from 
1928 to 1938 required expert planning to successfully execute the weeklong festivities 
and organize the hundreds of thousands of people in attendance. The Nuremberg party 
rally in 1934 best exemplified the exceptional competence the Nazis possessed for 
organizing events on the scale of the Olympics prior to 1936. The sheer number of 
individuals in attendance in 1934, while not quite on the same scale as the Olympics in 
1936, proved staggering. Approximately 519,000 Party affiliated individuals traveled to 
Nuremberg for the festivities.270 On the proclaimed “Army Day” 300,000 spectators 
looked on to a military parade in an ecstatic frenzy.271 It was from these events that 
Germany had a jump on the technology and processes needed to make an event of such 
magnitude function. The Nuremberg rallies also demonstrated the regime’s particularly 
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excellent command of the press and propaganda. The rallies themselves were a practice 
in manipulation of public perception. Special care was taken to “pamper” reporters and 
provide them with a positive experience of the rallies.272 The consideration shown 
towards domestic reporters during the Nuremberg rallies increased, especially for 
international reporters, in 1936. For example, the 105 international radio reporters 
received complimentary housing in the city of Berlin along with translators, guides, and 
all the press credentials needed to properly report on the Games.273 Along with generous 
accommodations, all radio broadcasters had access to top of the line facilities at the Reich 
Sport Field where they could work in soundproof transmitting cabins and use long-
distance phone lines.274 The Nazis’ unique experience with party rallies provided them 
with the proper infrastructure and planning process to make the Eleventh Olympic Games 
the grandest the world had yet seen. 
 The Nazis were also in a particularly good position to modernize the technology 
and media of the Olympics. The Nazi government’s desire to control the domestic 
opinion of the Party prior to the 1936 Games made for an easy transition to control the 
international perception of the German nation through influence of Olympic propaganda. 
The 1936 Olympics provided an unparalleled opportunity for a positive international 
show of the German nation during a time when many in the international community 
were wary of Hitler and the Nazi government. The Ministry of Propaganda led by Joseph 
Goebbels had plenty of experience with new forms of media prior to the 1936 Games. 
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Specifically, the Nazis’ experience with radio and experimentation with television in 
domestic matters prior to the 1936 Games allowed them to implement technology and 
media effectively on a global scale for the Games. As noted previously, since the Nazi 
rise to power, radio had been a medium used domestically for the dissemination of party 
messages through the distribution of the Volksempfänger. With such domestic success in 
radio, the Nazi party leaders saw similar potential for the medium of television. Prior to 
the Nazi-era, the Weimar Republic had experimented with television, but Nazi 
investment in the technology made it a reality. In 1935 a public venue for live television 
broadcast viewing was opened in the Reichspost Museum.275 The Nazis’ propaganda 
machine placed Germany in an advantageous position to organize a mass media effort 
and put on the first technologically modern Olympic Games.  
The Third Reich’ need for control translated into the need to oversee every aspect 
of the Olympics like no other government, especially with financial support. Even though 
the Nazi leaders attempted to hide their level of involvement in the Olympic Organizing 
Committee, the Nazis were not shy about financing Olympics. In previous Olympics it 
was not uncommon for the government of the host nation to allocate some funds to aid 
the Olympic organizers with the cost of putting on such an event, but the amount of 
money provided by the German government far exceeded anything previously. For 
example, in the 1932 Los Angeles Games the money for the development of a new 
stadium came from a combination of boosters’ efforts and two million dollar bond 
appropriation measures passed in 1928 and 1931 by the voters of California.276 To 
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compare, in 1934 the projected cost of all Olympic construction was 20 million 
Reichsmarks, of which the government agreed to pay 14.5 million RM.277 The Nazi 
government willing paid Olympic expenses when the Berlin government could not.278 
This included the development of technological innovations like the first mobile 
television transmitting unit installed on the Reich Sport Field with a price tag of 250,000 
Reichsmarks.279 Spending was not simply limited to Olympic facilities and technology. 
In true Nazi fashion, expenditures on propaganda were immense as well. Specifically, the 
creation of the film Olympia was completely funded by the Ministry of Propaganda. The 
contract Leni Riefenstahl signed with the Ministry of Propaganda allotted her a budget of 
1.5 million RM for the production of the film and a personal compensation of 250,000 
RM.280 To compare, the average German worker earned 2,500RM per year.281 The almost 
indiscriminate spending on the part of the Nazi government allowed for the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics to move the Games towards the modern era in scale, technological innovations, 
and successful implementation of mass media and advertising.    
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Conclusion 
 As the Olympic tradition marches on into the future, the Olympic Movement 
cannot separate itself from its past. The Nazis, situated in a unique spot in history and 
fueled by their own particular set of ambitions, created the first truly modern Olympic 
Games and irrevocably changed the Olympic Movement. No matter the current feelings 
towards Hitler and the Third Reich, the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games played a significant 
role in the formulation of the Olympic Games as they are known today.  
 A short examination of the IOC today reveals the lasting impact of the Nazi 
Games. The IOC’s continued changes to the selection process attempt to correct the same 
concerns addressed in 1936 and reflect the politicization of the selection process brought 
on by the international response to the Nazi regime. In a recent press release from 
February 27, 2017, the IOC announced the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020, 
which “strengthens its [IOC’s] stance in favour of human rights and against corruption in 
new host city contract.” 282 The IOC’s continued crackdown on human rights violations 
stems from the conception of the Olympic participation as an inherently political act. 
After Berlin, international concerns saddled political responsibility on the Olympic 
Movement. Also, despite recent reforms to the selection process bribery continues to 
present a challenge to the bid procedures. After the selection of Tokyo for the 2020 
Olympic Games allegations surfaced accusing one IOC member of accepting bribes from 
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the Tokyo Olympic Bid Committee to the tune of $1.5 million.283 The prevalence of back 
door deals and political maneuvering, started by Theodor Lewald, to obtain an Olympic 
bid is now an inseparable aspect of the Olympic Games.   
 Government investment in Olympic outcomes continues to be a characteristic 
aspect of the Olympic Games. With the findings of the McLaren report, the nationalistic 
tendencies usually associated with the Nazi Olympics and the Cold War era persist to the 
current day. The prevalence of propaganda related efforts also persists the prospect of the 
2022 Beijing Olympic Games one cannot help but remember the $40 billion nationalistic 
fanfare orchestrated in 2008 and wonder what the People’s Republic of China has in store 
for the 2022 Games.   
 The lasting impact of the Nazis’ use of technology perhaps is one of the easiest 
legacies to visually see. The Nazis were the first to use television broadcasting for the 
commercial purpose of sport, and since then, television has become one of the primary 
ways audiences across the world view the Olympic Games. The evidence of the impact of 
media and television on the Olympic Movement can be seen in an assessment of the Rio 
2016 Games. According to IOC reports, the half the world’s population watched Olympic 
coverage and official content on social media platforms received over seven billion 
views.284 The Rio Olympic Games is considered the most visible Games in Olympic 
history.285 The use of platforms such as radio and television in a commercial context 
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during the 1936 Games to reach a mass audience persists through today, but with even 
more platforms for audiences to find Olympic related content. 
 While the 1936 Berlin Olympics may be one of the most controversial Olympiads 
in Olympic history, the 1936 Games is also one of the most influential games in the 
development of the modern Olympic Movement. The Nazi Olympics altered the nature of 
the selection process, changed the way national governments interact with the Olympic 
Movement, and laid the technological groundwork subsequent Games used as a 
springboard to push the Olympic Games to a scale never even dreamed of by the IOC in 
1896. The defining characteristics of the Olympic Games in the modern era began with 
the 1936 Berlin Olympics; the first truly modern Olympiad.    
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